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Introduction

In 2003, the Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec) utilized 43 C.F.R. Part 417
(Part 417)3 to reduce the quantity of water available to a senior California
water-right holder and increased the quantity available to junior California
water-right holders. BuRec's action took place despite a declaration by the
Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) that the Colorado River was experiencing
normal flow conditions, and despite that the issue precipitating the
Secretary's action involved a beneficial-use dispute among California waterright holders only. BuRec's action had no potential to impact other
Colorado River basin states and California's aggregate use was not at issue.
BuRec conducted an informal adjudication to reallocate the water
under presumptive federal principles requiring reasonable beneficial use. In
doing so, BuRec ignored applicable California water and environmental
laws, applicable federal environmental laws, historical and continuing
exercise of jurisdiction by the California State Water Resources Control
Board (SWRCB), a request by the State of California for formal consultation,
administrative adjudicatory due process, and the terms of the United States
contract controlling water delivery.
This article addresses whether Part 417 authorizes and empowers
BuRec or the Secretary to act as an adjudicator of intra-state reasonable
beneficial use of Colorado River water. The authors conclude that Part 417
is not authority for agency adjudication; no express preemptive federal
legislation authorizes the Secretary to render a reasonable beneficial use
decision without deference to California reasonable beneficial use
determinations. The Secretary's reallocation of "permanently allocated"
water disregarded specific conflict-resolution procedures contained in the
water supply contract between the United States and the Imperial Irrigation
District, violated federal preemption jurisprudence, and ignored
Congressional intent and purpose. The 2003 adjudication and unilateral
reallocation lacked legal foundation, contract compliance, and adjudicatory
due process. Therefore, it should not be regarded as valid precedent.
A. Water in the West
Today's West is the culmination of over 150 years of water
development. The taming of the Colorado River played a major role. Over
the span of the twentieth century, a sophisticated water storage and delivery
network was built to capture and control the entire flow of the Colorado
River. Major dams at Glen Canyon and Boulder Canyon harnessed the main
stem of the Colorado River and a complementary phalanx of projects was

3.

The full text of 43 C.F.R. Part 417 is included as an appendix.
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built deep in the mountain arteries and tributaries of the Colorado River; a
drainage area totaling one-seventh of the continental United States.4
This water infrastructure has nurtured a vast and interdependent
network of agricultural communities and modern cities. Irrigation districts
in desert regions of Arizona and California supply water to some of the most
productive agricultural lands in the world.5 The same combination of sun
and water created an unstoppable recipe for growth in the major cities of the
southwest, such as Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix, Tucson, and Las Vegas,
each of which has experienced the largest percentage of national population
growth for the past decade.6
The conveyance, utilization and sharing of stored water in the Lower
Basin of the Colorado River among California, Nevada, and Arizona is highly
regulated and governed by a combination of contracts and federal, state,
and local laws. The California and federal requirement that Colorado River
water be put to "reasonable beneficial use" provides the starting point to
evaluate the proper reach of Part 417.
B. Reasonable Beneficial Use as a Key Concept in Western
Water Law
Western water law evolved to fit the needs of settlers of the dry
western landscape. Initially, each state utilized a combination of local rules,
customs, and laws best suited to meet its own challenges and development
needs; most commonly to support irrigation and mining activities. In recent
years, growing municipal demand has caused increased pressure to
reallocate supplies from those activities.
The first disputes over water helped define the concept of a water
right.7 A user acquired a defensible right to divert and use a quantity of
water at a certain location for a specific purpose during the year. When the
amount of water claimed, diverted and used converged, the right became
"perfected." The right was then given a priority8 superior to subsequent,

4. The Colorado River Basin . . . and Its Plumbing, in WESTERN WATER MADE SIMPLE 155
(Island Press 1987).
5.

MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 259-60, 333-34 (rev. ed., Penguin Books 1993).

6. California is projected to grow to 49.2 million from 32.5 million between
2000 and 2025; Arizona is projected to grow to 6.4 from 4.8; and Nevada is projected
to grow to 2.3 from 1.8 during the same period. PAUL CAMPBELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
POPULATION PROJECTIONS: STATES, 1995-2025, at 3 (1997), http://www.census.gov/
prod/2/pop/p25/p25-1131.pdf.
7.

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

8. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENVTL. L. 37 (2002); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient
Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998).
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junior competing users of the same water source. "First in time, first in
right" became the shorthand for the rule governing the Doctrine of Prior
Appropriation, and the principal tenet of state-based water right systems in
the West.
The priority system lends predictability and stability to the sharing of a
finite resource. When water is abundant, a greater number of junior water
rights can be satisfied. Conversely, when water is not abundant, the limited
supply is available first to the senior-most rights holders in descending
order of priority, so long as their use is "reasonable and beneficial." That
senior rights are satisfied before junior rights means that the holders of
junior rights shoulder the risk of water demand outstripping available supply
during dry years.
"Reasonable beneficial use" is the preeminent limitation on the
exercise of a water right and a "cardinal principle" of western water law.9
Unlike real property and the concept of fee simple absolute, no water right
holder possesses an absolute right to water. Instead, a water right
guarantees only the use of water, a usufructuary right, constrained by the
limits of reasonable, beneficial use as defined by each state.
The concept of reasonable, beneficial use has slowly evolved over time
in conjunction with the morphing ideals and values of states in the West.
California's State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) and state courts
are each expressly empowered to render reasonable, beneficial-use
determinations. These determinations are not the result of a formulaic
approach dependent upon a limited or defined checklist of variables.
Rather, reasonable, beneficial-use determinations are shaped by a factspecific balancing of considerations that are slowly evolving to reflect public
water policies and pragmatic realities facing existing users.
C. Colorado River Use and Dependence
The sharing of the Colorado River has been a historic point of tension
and antagonism among water rights holders in the Lower Basin states of
Arizona, Nevada and California. Within California, Colorado River water is a
pivotal state concern because it is necessary to sustain economic and
regional population growth.
On August 18, 1931, a number of existing California Colorado River
water users — including the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), and several
prospective users such as the Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD), the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), and the City and
County of San Diego — entered into the "Seven-Party Agreement" to divide
and share California's right to 4.4million acre-feet (MAF) per year (MAFY) to

9.

United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 171 (Ct. App. 1986).
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the Colorado River. 10 The California Department of Water Resources (DWR)
recommended the Seven-Party Agreement to the Secretary, who then
adopted verbatim the allocation and priority provisions of the Seven-Party
Agreement in BuRec's contract with each of the seven parties.11
In the recent past, California used as much as 5.2 MAFY of Colorado
River water, approximately 800,000 AFY in excess of California's maximum
basic water right to 4.4 MAFY. MWD, the wholesale water supplier to
millions living in coastal Southern California from San Diego County to
Ventura County, holds the most junior rights among the members of the
Seven Party Agreement. MWD holds almost 550,000 AFY of California's 4.4
MAFY and was the primary beneficiary of the California's 800,000 AFY of
excess Colorado River use. By 2000, 16.9 million people,12 roughly half of
California's population, depended, at least in part, on Colorado River water
provided by MWD.
Reducing MWD's Colorado River supply would require either
replacement by other in-state sources or a reduction in deliveries to urban
areas. The San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA), a member agency of
MWD, and the largest user of MWD water, perceived itself as more
vulnerable to MWD supply constraints than other MWD users because its
rights are junior to other users and because SDCWA has very limited
alternative local supplies.
In contrast to MWD and SDCWA, IID holds a large and senior Colorado
River water right to over 3.1 MAFY of California's agricultural right to 3.85
MAFY. Smaller and more senior rights to 400,000 to 500,000 AFY of
agriculture's 3.85 MAFY belong to the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID)
and the Yuma Project Irrigation District (YPID). CVWD holds a right junior to
IID for the balance of the 3.85 MAFY.
1. IID - A Community Built On Agriculture
The Imperial Valley, located about two hours east of San Diego near
the Arizona-Mexico border, is one of California's major agricultural regions.
Farming is the primary economic engine for the area.13 Year-round sunshine
allows Imperial Valley farmers to grow crops through all four seasons.14
Much of the land is double and triple-cropped with numerous and diverse

10. Declaration of Jesse P. Silva in Support of Imperial Irrigation District's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction ¶ 20, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03 CV
0069W (JFS), (S.D. Cal. 2003) [hereinafter Silva Dec.].
11.

Id.

12.

REPORT ON METROPOLITAN’S WATER SUPPLIES app. A, at 2 (March 25, 2003).

13.

Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 14.

14.

Id.
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field, vegetable, and permanent crops.15 In 2001, for example, over 50
different crops were commercially grown,16 producing a gross value of
$1.01 billion.17
The Imperial Valley has a desert climate with an average rainfall of
three inches per year.18
All Imperial Valley farmers, businesses,
municipalities, and residents rely on IID's Colorado River water right.19 The
combination of little rain, one source of water, and an agricultural economy
makes a threat to IID's Colorado River right a very serious matter.
IID delivers water to approximately 450,000 acres of farmland in the
Imperial Valley (about 703 square miles).20 Distribution of water is
principally achieved through a gravity-flow system that includes the 82-mile
All-American Canal, almost 1,700 miles of other delivery canals servicing
about 6,300 headgates, numerous reservoirs, and over 1,400 miles of
drainage ditches.21
2. IID's Long-Established Colorado River Right
Unlike most BuRec contractors, IID's Colorado River water right
predates its federal contract with the United States by decades. IID's right
to appropriate Colorado River water originated in 1885 under California law,
when a number of individuals and the California Development Company
made a series of appropriations totaling 7.0 MAFY for use in the Imperial
Valley.22 The Southern Pacific Company later acquired these water rights.23
IID was formed in 1911.24 On June22, 1916, the Southern Pacific Company
conveyed all of its water rights to IID.25 By 1929, at least 424,145 acres of
the Imperial Valley's approximately one million irrigable acres were
under irrigation.26
Under the Seven-Party Agreement, IID agreed to limit its water right in
quantity and priority to a third priority right in the amount of 3.85 MAFY,

15.

Id.

16.

IMPERIAL COUNTY AGRICULTURAL CROP & LIVESTOCK REPORT 3-8 (2001).

17.

Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 14.

18.

Id. ¶ 13.

19.

Id.

20. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., 2005 ANNUAL WATER REPORT 29 (2005), available at
http://www.iid.com/Media/2005IIDWaterAnnualReport.pdf.
21.

Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 10.

22.

Id. ¶ 19.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id.

26.

Id.
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minus Priority 1 and Priority 2 usage, as well as to a sixth and seventh
priority right for water available to California above 4.4 MAFY.27 Article17 of
the 1932 contract between IID and the United States obligates the Secretary
to deliver to IID "so much water as may be necessary to supply the District a
total quantity . . . in the amounts and with priorities in accordance with
[those stated in the Seven-Party Agreement]."28
Upon entering the 1932 contract, IID thought that the Coachella Valley
would also become a part of IID's service area, even though such lands had
no historic or pre-existing water right to the Colorado River.29 However, the
Coachella Valley farmers eventually negotiated their own contract with the
United States. In 1934, IID and CVWD executed a Compromise Agreement
that permitted CVWD to contract directly with the United States, but
expressly required that CVWD's right to Colorado River water would be
subordinate in perpetuity to IID's senior right.30 Therefore, within the third,
sixth and seventh priorities, as set forth in the Seven-Party Agreement and
all the California right holder water delivery contracts with the United States,
IID's right to use Colorado River water is senior to CVWD's right.31
The result of the Seven-Party Agreement water allocations, as
incorporated into the United States contracts with each party in a 4.4 MAFY
non-surplus year, is as follows:32

Id. ¶ 21.

28.

Id. ¶ 23.

29.

Id. ¶ 24.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. ¶ 26.

1506

27.

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

Priority

Description

1

Palo Verde Irrigation District—for a gross
area of 104,500 acres

2

Yuma Project (Reservation District)—up
to a gross area of 25,000 acres

3a

Imperial Irrigation District (senior)

Annual Acre-feet

3,850,000

Coachella Valley Water District (junior)
3b

Palo Verde Irrigation District—for 16,000
acres of mesa lands

4

Metropolitan Water District and/or City of
Los Angeles and/or others on coastal plain

550,000

SUBTOTAL

4.4 MAFY

When California is limited to 4.4 MAFY, subject to a reasonable,
beneficial-use requirement, IID may use, and the United States has a
contractual obligation to deliver, 3.85 MAFY minus amounts used by
Priorities 1 and 2 (and adjusted pro rata for any use by Palo Verde Irrigation
District (PVID) under Priority 3b).33 The remainder of the 3.85 MAFY
agricultural entitlement is available to junior right holder CVWD. In years
when California can receive only 4.4 MAF, only 550,000 AF is available to
junior right holder MWD under the contractual priority agreements.34
3. Drainage to the Salton Sea
Another important aspect of IID water use is the interrelationship
between irrigated agriculture in the Imperial Valley and the Salton Sea,
California's largest lake. The destruction of wetlands in coastal Southern
California, as a result of development and the loss of wetlands in the Gulf of

33.

Id. ¶ 28.

34. This ignores some senior miscellaneous and present perfected rights of
smaller users, which reduces MWD's junior right even further. MWD contends that
these minor senior rights should reduce the agricultural right of 3.85 MAFY because
the use is primarily for agriculture. This dispute was settled by the Quantification
Settlement Agreement.
1507

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

California in Mexico from Colorado River use, has caused the Salton Sea to
become the new home for approximately 400 different bird species. The
Salton Sea averages between 1.5 million and 2 million water birds per year.35
The Salton Sea has become an integral component of the Pacific Flyway,
providing an important migratory stopover for fall and spring shorebirds and
supporting large populations of wintering waterfowl. The Salton Sea is only
one of four remaining interior sites along the Pacific Flyway that supports
over 100,000 migrating shorebirds.36 Many of the birds that stopover at the
Salton Sea are listed as endangered or threatened species, or species of
concern under federal and California endangered species laws.37
As a terminal lake with farm runoff as the primary source of inflow, the
Salton Sea exists today only because of irrigated agriculture in the Imperial
and Coachella Valleys.38 From 1950 to 1999, for example, over 86 percent of
the Salton Sea's average annual inflow of 1.34 MAF came from Imperial
Valley irrigation drainage.39 Any reduction in IID water deliveries, or any
increase in irrigation efficiency that reduces IID irrigation drainage, causes a
reduction of inflow to the Salton Sea and a corresponding negative
environmental impact on the species which nest and feed there.
4. California Exercises Jurisdiction Over IID's
Reasonable Beneficial Use
In the early 1980s, flooding from rising Salton Sea elevations damaged
certain farmland in IID adjacent to the Salton Sea. The affected farmer then
brought a lawsuit against IID to reduce the flooding by reducing Salton Sea
inflows through forcing higher water use efficiencies. In 1983, the SWRCB
held a lengthy evidentiary adjudicatory hearing, in which BuRec participated
both as a party and as an expert witness. The SWRCB issued a lengthy
decision containing detailed factual findings and legal conclusions
regarding IID's water use and California's requirement for reasonable
beneficial use, and ordered IID to undertake certain corrective measures.
Further hearings, an additional decision, and a court order were issued in

35. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER CONSERVATION AND TRANSFER PROJECT: FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. A, at A2-40
(June 2002).
36.

Id. at A2-41.

37.

Id. at A1-11 to -12, A2-54.

38.

Id. at A2-13.

39. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., WATER CONSERVATION AND TRANSFER PROJECT AND
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT § 3.1, at 70 (January 2002); IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., supra note 35, at § 1.1.
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1988.40 The SWRCB retained jurisdiction over IID's reasonable, beneficial
use and required IID to report semi-annually on its water use(s) and
improvements to more efficiently deliver and use Colorado River water. In
Order 88-20, SWRCB mandated IID to implement a conservation project
sufficient to save at least 100,000 AFY.41 In 1988, IID entered into a longterm conserved water transfer agreement with MWD. MWD paid the costs of
water conservation in exchange for the right to receive the conserved water
from IID.42
D. California's 4.4 MAFY Limit Begins to Pinch
Pursuant to the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA),43 the BuRec
operates the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River and delivers water to
California right holders consistent with the Seven-Party Agreement
priorities. Under normal flow conditions, California right holders are
entitled to consumptively use 4.4 MAFY. More is available in surplus years,
and less in shortage years. The Secretary declared 2003 a normal flow year.44
1. California Overuse of Colorado River
Between 1964 and 2002, California use of the Colorado River exceeded
4.4 MAFY in every year but two.45 California utilized as much as 800,000 AFY
of surplus and unused entitlement of Nevada and Arizona. In 1980, Arizona
passed the landmark Arizona Groundwater Management Act46 to centralize
management of statewide groundwater resources and to establish

40. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250, 254-57
(Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857 (1991).
41. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Decision 1600, at 69 (Cal. State Water Res. Control
Bd. June 21, 1984), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/decisions/
WRD1600.PDF; Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WR 88-20, at 44 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. Sept. 7, 1988), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/
WaterRightOrders/WRO88-20.pdf.
42. Imperial Irrigation Dist. & Metro. Water Dist., Agreement for Implementation
of a Water Conservation Program and Use of Conserved Water (1988).
43.

43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (2008).

44.

Silva Dec., supra note 10, ¶ 27.

45. According to the Bureau of Reclamation’s field office, which manages such
statistics, the exact year that California exceeded 4.4 can only be narrowed to a
window of time between 1958 and 1964 at which time California was at 5.0 MAF.
46. The Groundwater Code, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -704 (2008), was
originally enacted as part of the Groundwater Management Act of 1980, ch. 1, 1980
Ariz. Sess. Laws, 4th Spec. Sess. § 86.
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"groundwater banks" to store any portion of its annual 2.8 MAF Colorado
River entitlement that could not be consumptively used within Arizona in
any given year. In 1990, Arizona announced that it was ready to fully utilize
its 2.8 MAFY share of the Colorado River, putting California on notice that
its use of Arizona's unused entitlement was about to end.47 During this
same period, Nevada surpassed its annual Colorado River entitlement of
300,000 AFY and edged towards 330,000 AFY due to the explosive growth of
Southern Nevada.
Today, Nevada and Arizona regularly utilize their full Colorado River
entitlements. For over a decade, Nevada and Arizona, along with Colorado,
New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, and the BuRec encouraged California to
reduce its dependency on the unused entitlement of Arizona and Nevada
and on surplus-flow declarations.48 Such reduction, however, was not easy
to accomplish.
2. Interim Surplus Guidelines and the Quantification
Settlement Agreement
Over a few brief years, California's nearly 40-year reliance on up to
800,000 AFY of Colorado River surplus or unused entitlement entered a
phasing-out period. Throughout this period, MWD's sought to gradually
decrease, over a period of years, its dependence on the unused entitlement
of Arizona and Nevada and avoid the harsh reality of an abrupt shutoff.49
Though IID's 1988 conserved-water transfer to MWD added 100,000 AFY to
MWD's normal year supply, MWD still required an additional 550,000 AFY
above its normal year entitlement.

47. James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water
from the Colorado River Part II: The Development, Implementation and Collapse of California’s Plan
to Live Within Its Basic Apportionment, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 318, 322-36 (2003).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1552 (2008). Each year, BuRec takes inventory of existing
reservoir levels in its Upper and Lower basin systems and creates an Annual
Operating Plan (AOP). It solicits water delivery orders from contractors anticipating
their annual needs and factors a complex set of interdependent variables such as
hydropower production, water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife needs, obligations
to Mexico, and others. Depending on the final assessment, a pronouncement will
indicate whether the system will be operated according to “surplus,” “normal,” or
“shortage” conditions relative to the baseline of 7.5 MAF annual minimum delivery
for the Lower Basin. When a surplus exists, the Law of the River has an explicit
scheme for division of excess waters which favors California. When the AOP declares
a normal year, each state is restricted to its maximum portion of water (4.4/2.8/0.3
MAFY), although California usually benefited from the portion of water that Arizona
could not put to use.
49.
1510
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By 1998, a collection of California parties, other Basin States, the
Secretary, and BuRec began developing the "4.4Plan." The Plan's goal was to
voluntarily conserve and transfer for urban use a portion of the Colorado
River water used by agricultural right holders.50 IID's ability to conserve and
transfer water was identified as a significant possible new source of urban
supply to help California live within its 4.4 MAFY limit. However, a quick
agreement was not forthcoming.
In 2001, the Secretary offered California an incentive of "Interim
Surplus Guidelines"51 (ISG) that would provide California fifteen years to
ramp down to 4.4 MAFY.52 Through the ISG, the Secretary required
California's Colorado River contractors to revisit their respective water
allocations per the 1931 Seven-Party Agreement and devise a Quantification
Settlement Agreement (QSA) by December31, 2002, to settle their disputes,
provide for new limits on IID water use, and allow intra-state conserved
water transfers. Should the QSA not be executed by December 31, 2002, the
Secretary reserved the authority to suspend the ISG and immediately limit
California to 4.4 MAFY.
The QSA specifically sought to resolve long-standing differences
between the Seven Party Agreement signors. The QSA addressed disputes
between MWD, CVWD, and IID regarding reasonable, beneficial use, the right
to transfer conserved Colorado River water, the sharing of responsibility for
required environmental mitigation for conservation and transfer impacts, as
well as various other disputes.
SDCWA, responding to the increased risk of a truncated MWD water
supply, sought to bolster its own water reliability by independently
acquiring conserved water from IID.53 A transfer of conserved water from IID
directly to SDCWA, through MWD's conveyance aqueduct, would be based
upon increased IID irrigation efficiency.54 SDCWA payments to IID would
allow IID to implement technological and other efficiency improvements.
SDCWA would reap the benefit of acquiring the saved water (potentially up
to 300,000 AFY)55 at IID's high senior priority.
In 2002, the SWRCB issued Order 2002-13, in which it reviewed IID's
water use in the context of the voluntary conservation and transfer petition
jointly filed by IID and SDCWA.56 The SWRCB approved IID's request to

50.

Id. at 358.

51.

Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7772 (Jan. 25, 2001).

52.

Lochhead, supra note 47, at 359-65, 390-401.

53.

Id. at 322-36.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WRO 2002-13 (Cal. State Water Res. Control
Bd. Oct. 28, 2002).
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transfer up to 300,000 AFY of conserved water to SDCWA and CVWD, with an
option for MWD, conditioned on certain environmental safeguards for the
Salton Sea and other habitats.57 The SWRCB again retained jurisdiction.58
Throughout 2002, the California Legislature, various state agencies, and
agricultural, urban, and environmental interests feverishly negotiated the
terms of a fully consensual QSA. After the California legislature adopted
special legislation in September 2002 to allow the taking of a highlyprotected endangered species to facilitate the implementation of the QSA, a
final push was made to finalize the QSA before the Secretary's December 31,
2002, deadline.
3. BuRec's Refusal To Honor IID's 2003 Water Order
In early December of 2002, IID's Board of Directors refused to approve
the proposed QSA.
IID asserted the QSA imposed unacceptable
environmental costs and risks on IID and its water users. The Secretary
rejected the same QSA as having too many environmental mitigationrelated cancellation provisions. On December 31, IID and SDCWA approved
a revised QSA that MWD and CVWD rejected.
The year drawing to a close, the Secretary declared a normal condition
on the River for 200359 and announced that California would be limited to a
maximum of 4.4 MAF in 2003. The Secretary suspended the ISG60 forcing
California to deal with an instant water loss of 800,000 AFY.
The Secretary did not stop there. The Secretary announced through
the BuRec that IID's water delivery would also be reduced to a consumptive
use volume of approximately 2.86 MAF in contrast to IID's requested
consumptive use of 3.1 MAF. The Secretary granted the difference of almost
250,000 AF to junior right holders CVWD and MWD. BuRec articulated a
reasonable, beneficial use cap of 2.86 MAFY for IID and relied on 43 C.F.R.
Part 417 as authority for this intrastate reallocation from a senior right holder
to two junior right holders. The letter61 of the Assistant Secretary for Water
and Science set the reasonable beneficial use cap at a volume based on a
formulaic application of the Supreme Court Decree in Arizona v. California.62

57.

Id. at 86-87.

58.

Id. at 88-94.

59.

Lochhead, supra note 47, at 399-400.

60.

Id. at 398.

61. Letter from Bennett Raley, Assistant Sec’y of the Interior, to Jesse Silva,
Gen. Manager, Imperial Irrigation Dist. (Dec. 27, 2002) (on file with author and
Hastings W.-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y).
62.
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The Secretary's cutback of water to IID was an unprecedented use of
Part 417 and an extraordinary federal intrusion into the province of
intrastate reasonable beneficial use determinations.
4. Imperial Irrigation District v. United States (2003)
On January10, 2003, IID filed suit to enjoin the federal reduction and
challenge the Secretary's authority to unilaterally adjudicate IID's 2003
Colorado River entitlement.63 IID's complaint alleged that Part 417 was
adopted in excess of the Secretary's authority,64 and, even if valid, Part 417
was improperly applied to IID's 2003 water order.65 Importantly, the
Secretary's authority to limit California to 4.4 MAFY was not challenged.
The federal district court agreed that IID's contract with the Secretary
was likely breached by the imposition of the cap identified by the Assistant
Secretary, and that BuRec had not acted properly under Part 417. The court
preliminarily enjoined the federal cutback, but made no final decision on the
validity, scope, or reach of Part 417. The court reserved the question of the
propriety of BuRec authority to make reasonable beneficial use
adjudications and the validity and legality of Part 417 to future hearings.66

63. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, No. 03-CV-0069W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2003). Articles contemporary
to the lawsuit include: David R.E. Aladjem, Reclamation Determines Beneficial Use of Water
by California’s IID, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., August 2003; Michael J.
Pearce, The Federalization of Beneficial Use, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL.,
June 2003; David Lindgren, Southern Nevada Water Authority’s Perspective, A.B.A. WATER
RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; Michael Pearce, Arizona Reflections on the
Suspension of the Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; Scott Balcomb, Colorado’s View An Upper Basin
Perspective of California’s Need to Reduce Its Colorado River Water Use, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; Jeffrey Kightlinger, California’s Painful Journey to 4.4,
A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; James Taylor, San Diego’s
Perspective, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003; John Penn
Carter, Water Confiscation! Imperial Valley’s New Challenge, A.B.A. WATER RESOURCES
COMMITTEE NEWSL., February 2003.
64.

Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 62, at 46.

65.

Id. § XII, at 46-47 (Eighth Claim for Relief).

66. Order Remanding Action, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States, No. 03 CV
0069W(JFS) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2003); Order re: Clarification, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, No. 03 CV 0069W(JFS) (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2003).
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5. BuRec's De Novo 43 C.F.R. Part 417 Determination
After the preliminary injunction halted the reduction in water
deliveries to IID, BuRec requested and received district court permission to
conduct a de novo Part 417 review.67 For the first time, BuRec extensively
adjudicated IID's requested water order for calendar year 2003 under the
Part 417 reasonable, beneficial-use standards.
The Regional Director issued a decision on August 29, 2003, in which
he concluded that IID, which had ordered 3.1 MAF in 2003, needed only 2.84
MAF for reasonable, beneficial use. Volumes above that were deemed
wasteful.68 By identifying volumes above 2.84 MAF as wasteful, BuRec
denied IID the benefit of its senior water right and authorized the wasted
water to be reallocated to junior water rights holders, CVWD and MWD,
without charge.69 The preliminary injunction, however, precluded BuRec's
decision from being implemented.
IID submitted to BuRec the administrative record from the 2002
SWRCB proceeding, as well as substantial volumes of other evidence.
BuRec, however, reached its Part 417 reasonable, beneficial-use decision70
independent of and without consideration of the 2002 SWRCB water transfer
approval. BuRec ignored the prior SWRCB decision which allowed IID's
conserved water to be transferred to SDWCA under California law in
exchange for payments from SDWCA to IID to fund environmental mitigation
and conservation costs.
BuRec also ignored the SWRCB specific
requirements for environmental mitigation as a condition to the
conservation and transfer. BuRec held no hearings, allowed no discovery by
IID, and allowed no cross-examination by IID of BuRec experts.
BuRec specifically ignored the costs of proposed IID efficiency
improvements, the costs of SWRCB-imposed environmental mitigation, and
failed to consider or discuss the link between IID conservation activity and

67. Federal Defendants' Brief re Remedy for 43 C.F.R. Part 417 Breach Found
by Court on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. United States,
No. 03 CV 0069W (JFS) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2003).
68. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, LOWER COLORADO REGION,
PART 417 REGIONAL DIRECTOR’S FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND DETERMINATIONS, IMPERIAL
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, CALENDAR YEAR 2003 59 (Aug. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.imperialgroup.info/PDF/417FinalRec.pdf.
69. Coincidentally, the amount of water gained by MWD through this federal
review was approximately the exact same amount MWD was in jeopardy of losing as
a result of California’s reduction of Colorado River water in excess of 4.4 MAFY.
70. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, LOWER COLORADO REGION,
PART 417 REGIONAL DIRECTOR’S INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND DETERMINATIONS, IMPERIAL
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, CALENDAR YEAR 2003 (July 2, 2003); see also U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, supra note 68.
1514

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

environmental impacts. Relying on the alleged authority of Part 417, BuRec
adjudged that IID was inefficiently irrigating and thus wasting water in
violation of the reasonable, beneficial-use requirement in IID's federal
contract for water delivery. BuRec thus negated the SWRCB-authorized
transfer of conserved water.
IID appealed BuRec's Part417 decision to the Secretary, and ultimately
would have sought judicial review in the pending lawsuit. The appeal was
rendered moot and the IID litigation dismissed after the QSA was further
negotiated, revised and finally executed on October10, 2003.
The district court never ruled upon the validity and use of Part 417
as applied in 2003. It remains an open legal question and the focus of
this article.
II.

Federal Preemption of California Reasonable Beneficial Use
Law or Jurisdiction is Not Warranted

The legitimate role for Part 417 depends upon whether the Secretary
can trump California authority to make reasonable beneficial use
determinations for Colorado River water to be used entirely within California
and within California's 4.4 MAFY right. BuRec relied solely on Part 417 as
authority for the alleged exclusive federal right to make reasonable,
beneficial-use determinations. California constitutional, statutory, common
and administrative law governing reasonable, beneficial use was totally
ignored. The legal question is whether a federal contract requiring
reasonable, beneficial use coupled with Part 417 preempts California
reasonable beneficial use law and jurisdiction.71
A. Doctrinal Framework for Preemption Analysis
Three types of preemption analyses are available to evaluate the
interrelationship of federal and California law: express preemption; field
preemption; and conflict preemption.72

71. An alternative statutory construction analysis is also warranted, and in the
view of the authors, leads to the same conclusion. See infra note 78.
72. Of inestimable help in understanding the framework and proper structural
analysis of preemption analysis: Amy K. Kelley, Staging a Comeback—Section 8 of the
Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Kelley, Staging a Comeback];
Roderick Walston, Reborn Federalism in Western Water Law: The New Melones
Decision, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1645 (1979); Amy K. Kelley, Federal Preemption and State
Water Law, 105 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Kelley,
Federal Preemption and State Water Law], http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/pdf/
V105_A2.pdf#search='Amy%20K.%20Kelley'.
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Express preemption arises in the context of Congressional legislation
that unambiguously asserts federal authority and expressly prohibits state
activity in a particular legal domain.73 State regulation within the federallylegislated domain is expressly forbidden and all enforcement authority is
completely consolidated within federal control.74
Field preemption is similarly based on an express or "dominant"
federal interest,75 but involves an implied intent to "occupy the field"76 rather
than the express prohibition of state activity.
Conflict preemption examines whether specific provisions of federal
law conflict with state law. State law that is in direct conflict with,
inconsistent with, or frustrates the implied intent and purpose of
Congressional action is nullified by the federal law77 if it cannot be
reconciled with the federal purpose.78
Congress has neither expressly preempted a role for the states in
reasonable beneficial use determinations for intrastate use of Colorado
River water nor specifically enacted any federal program to occupy the field
of reasonable beneficial use adjudications for intrastate use of Colorado
River water. To the contrary, the savings clause of section 8 of the
Reclamation Act expressly preserves state authority:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the
Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall
proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein
shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the
Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or
user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the
waters thereof.79

73.

Kelley, Federal Preemption and State Water Law, supra note 72, at 5.

74.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 384-85 (2d ed. 2005).

75.

Kelley, Federal Preemption and State Water Law, supra note 72, at 5.

76.

Id.

77.

A prime example of field preemption is federal control of nuclear regulation.

78.

Kelley, Federal Preemption and State Water Law, supra note 72, at 6.

79. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2008). This specific Congressional directive to the
Secretary to "proceed in conformity" with the laws of the states relating to the use of
water used in irrigation negates any implied authority of the Secretary to issue
regulations for the use of irrigation water inconsistent with state laws or to ignore
state laws or state's rights. Furthermore, the general powers of the Secretary
1516
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Neither the Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA) nor any other
subsequent Congressional legislation or law regarding the Colorado River
expressly or impliedly preempts applicable state reasonable beneficial use
law. Thus, a federal reasonable beneficial use determination preempts state
law only if a conflict preemption analysis reveals an irreconcilable conflict
between a federal purpose and state law. Without a clear conflict, California
reasonable, beneficial-use decisions and control remain valid and beyond
federal preemption.
B. Federal Reasonable Beneficial Use Authorities
1. Presumptions of Federal Supremacy and
Deference to States
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution reserves to
Congress the authority to preempt state law.80 Both the Commerce Clause81
and the Property Clause82 establish a fundamental foundation and context
for federal authority, should Congress decide to exercise its power. The two
prominent examples of Congressional preemption of state supremacy in the
water law context, distinct from reclamation law, are navigational servitudes
and federal reserved water rights.83
Three years before passage of the Reclamation Act in 1902, United States
v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.84 addressed whether the federal government
had the power to limit the building of a dam (near the present day Elephant
Butte Dam in New Mexico) if the construction of the dam would impact and
limit the downstream navigability of the Rio Grande.85 The court traced the
roots of federal authority in the realm of water rights to a "preexisting right
of possession" under state authority.86 This essential context solidified the

authorized by § 10 of the Reclamation Act are subservient to the specific restrictions
of § 8 under common principles of statutory construction that the more specific
statutory language prevails over the more general language. The Rehnquist opinion
in California v. Arizona, discussed infra, appears to rely on this analytical approach of
statutory construction.
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
81. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
82. Id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
83. "Although this power of changing the common-law rule as to streams
within its dominion undoubtedly belongs in each state, yet two limitations must be
recognized." United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
84.

Id.

85.

Id. at 702.

86.

It is the established doctrine of this court that rights of
miners . . . and for purposes of agricultural irrigation, in the region
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premise of state sovereignty over water resources; yet, the basis for
preemptive federal authority was the express reserved authority of Congress
to ensure the integrity of the waterways which served as the "natural
highways" of interstate commerce.87 The federal commerce authority and
control over navigable waterways preempted state law.
A second non-reclamation case, United States v. New Mexico,88 addressed
whether the United States reserved any water right for federal purposes at
the time it created the Gila National Forest in 1899.89 Of paramount
importance was the distinction between express and implied Congressional
intent and the limits to implied intent if any was found.90 The Supreme
Court confirmed federal preemption over state water rights regimes by
concluding that Congress had expressly created the national forest and
attached an implied reservation of a water right necessary to accomplish the
express federal purpose.91 But, the Supreme Court struck down a U.S. Forest
Service claim to water beyond the express Congressional purpose of timber
preservation. Other uses of the National Forests, such as recreation,
aesthetics, wildlife preservation, or cattle grazing, not expressly identified in
the legislation establishing the Gila National Forest, did not warrant an
implied federal preemption of state law for procuring water supplies.92 The

where such artificial use of the water was an absolute necessity,
are rights which the government had, by its conduct, recognized
and encouraged, and was bound to protect, before the passage of
the act of 1866. We are of opinion that the section of the act which
we have quoted was rather a voluntary recognition of a preexisting
right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use,
than the establishment of a new one.
Id. at 705.
87.

[I]t is limited by the superior power of the general government to
secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams
within the limits of the United States. In other words, the
jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce
and its natural highways vests in that government the right to take
all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable
water courses of the country, even against any state action.

Id. at 703.
88.

438 U.S. 696 (1978).

89.

Id. at 698.

90.

Id.

91. "[W]ater is frequently necessary to achieve the purposes for which these
reservations are made. But Congress has seldom expressly reserved water for use on
these withdrawn lands." Id. at 699.
92.
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Supreme Court unambiguously curtailed the implied authority to displace
state water law93 beyond the expressed purposes articulated in a given
federal act.
2. Federal Statutes and Interstate Agreements
The Supreme Court's admonition that conditions imposed by a state
are invalid if inconsistent with congressional directives provides a threshold
question of preemption.94 The inquiry of the conflict preemption analysis is
to determine the scope and purpose of express congressional directives that
pertain to reasonable, beneficial use and the role of the Secretary regarding
the Colorado River.
Federal authority for the control and use of the Lower Colorado River
originates in the 1902 Reclamation Act and the subsequent 1928 Boulder
Canyon Project Act (BCPA). Upon these two federal statutes rests a unique
cluster of arrangements — including an interstate compact, federal
regulations, water delivery contracts and Supreme Court decisions and
decrees — collectively referred to as the "Law of the River."95
a. Reclamation Act (1902)
Congress launched federal involvement in the water reclamation
business with the landmark Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902.96 Western
states envisioned reclaiming the predominately dry lands west of the 100th

93. A particularly interesting footnote within a footnote is the fact that New
Mexico was decided on the same day as California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978),
and both were written by [future, now deceased] Chief Justice William Rehnquist as
an Associate Justice.
94.

United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1982).

95. Understanding the Law of the River requires a grasp of the history, actors,
and phases of litigation beyond the possible scope of a single paper. Excellent
introductory resources are: Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1966); James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California’s Claims to Water from
the Colorado River Part I: The Law of the River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290 (2001); Kara
Gillon, Watershed Down?: The Ups and Downs of Watershed Management in the Southwest, 5 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 395 (2002); Warren Abbott, California Colorado River Issues, 19 PAC.
L.J. 1391 (1988); Gary Weatherford, Decree Enforcement Comes into the Law of the River: Cross
Currents in Cutting California to 4.4 MAFY, 49 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 8-1 (2003);
Lochhead, supra note 47; Robert Glennon & Peter Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and
Why the Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903 (2002).
96. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
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meridian through massive irrigation projects.97 However, this vision required
federal funding to make the infrastructure projects financially feasible.
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act reserves state authority over water
resources.98 It also provides, "[t]he right to the use of water acquired under
the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and
beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."99 Each state
was limited by the federal requirement that federal reclamation waters could
only be distributed for beneficial uses; but this limitation was lifted directly
from existing state law. No explicit enunciation of any separate federal
standard of reasonable, beneficial use accompanied the statute. Thus, the
meaning of reasonable, beneficial use remained with each state, for which
the requirement already existed.
Section 10 of the Reclamation Act authorized the Secretary "to perform
any and all acts and to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
and proper for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act into full
force and effect."100 This express regulatory authority is not itself sufficient
to create a conflict with state reasonable, beneficial use laws. Under the New
Mexico holding, federal regulations do not preempt state law unless such
regulations carry out the express purposes of the Act and are necessary to
fulfill that federal purpose. A general power to adopt necessary and
proper regulations creates no basis for finding conflict with a pre-existing
state role and no authority in defining and enforcing intrastate reasonable,
beneficial use.
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provides no support for conflict
preemption. The express beneficial use limitation on the right to use
reclamation project water is imposed without federal definition and without
any identified federal process for making reasonable, beneficial use
decisions. Accordingly, the requirement does not create an express conflict
with any state law that defines or limits water rights to reasonable,
beneficial use, even when such state law also includes substantive
definitions and dispute resolution and enforcement procedures.
b. Colorado River Compact (1922)
Congress authorized construction and operation of federal projects
through the Department of the Interior (Interior) and BuRec. In conjunction
with federal support, many states successfully developed surface water

97.

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978).

98. Reclamation Act § 8. Note that the utilization of Part 417 regarding IID
also requires recognition that IID's water rights to the Colorado River were first
obtained under state law prior to any reclamation project involvement.
99.
100.
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supplies on large interstate rivers. In an important early precedent, the
Supreme Court declared that as between states with similar prior
appropriation water-rights systems, priority established by "first in time, first
in right" was without regard to a fixed or guaranteed portion of water for
users in different states.101
The prior appropriation system which protected senior users from
junior users within each state was extended at an interstate level. This
immediately fueled rivalry among states and raised concerns about relative
rates of growth and the prospect of permanent state-level loss of
undeveloped water. If an entire river was put to beneficial use by a
downstream state before an upstream state utilized any water, the slower
developing state could legally be deprived of all use of water which passed
through it.
The Upper Basin Colorado River States determined that proactive
steps were necessary to prevent California, the fastest growing Basin State,
from establishing priority through prior appropriation to all or most of the
Colorado River. The Colorado River Compact (Compact) divided the waters
of the Colorado into "Upper"102 and "Lower"103 Basins and decoupled the
prior appropriation system between the two basins. The Upper Basin was
freed from pressure to develop its waters or risk losing them in perpetuity to
the ascendant California.
However, the Compact did not partition rights to the Colorado River
between the states of each basin. The Lower Basin States of Arizona,
Nevada, and California had to determine how to fairly split their collective
7.5 MAFY among themselves. The Compact referenced that the volumes
were for beneficial use only. However, it provided no illuminating detail and
omitted any clarifying or common definition in regard to reasonable,
beneficial use. The absence of such language prevents any interpretive
insight into later federal legislation which incorporated the Compact's
beneficial use requirement.
c. Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928)
California enjoyed the use of the Colorado River for agriculture in the
Imperial Valley long before the 1902 Reclamation Act was passed. However,
intermittent flooding and abundant seasonal sediment which damaged
irrigation projects combined with the issue of Mexico's water claims to
escalate pressure on Congress for local Imperial infrastructure support,
culminating in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA).104

101.

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).

102.

Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah.

103.

California, Arizona, and Nevada.

104.

43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (2008).
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Section 1 identifies the BCPA's express purposes: flood control,
navigation and water regulation, and the reclamation of public lands
(irrigation).105 Electrical energy production is an additional, but subordinate,
purpose.106 Section 1 expressly references "beneficial use" as the limit on
the use of reclamation water, but omits any substantive definition of
reasonable, beneficial use or any process for federal determination of
reasonable, beneficial use.107 Instead, section 1 outlines the scope of
Secretarial authority to "construct, operate, and maintain a dam and
incidental works in the main stream" of the River and a "main canal and
appurtenant structures."108 It primarily describes the Secretary as a builder
and operator of infrastructure rather than as a regulator or adjudicator of the
reasonable, beneficial use requirement.
Section 4(a) of the BCPA divides the Lower Basin apportionment of 7.5
MAFY among California, Arizona, and Nevada109 and details the
contingencies necessary for ratifying the Colorado River Compact.110 Lower
Basin states cannot withhold water from each other under a standard of
reasonable application [of water] to domestic and agricultural uses. The
1922 Compact is referenced as the standard for reasonable application to
which all three states are bound.111 However, as mentioned above, the
Compact is notably silent as to any definition or process for determining
"reasonable application." Section 4(a) is also silent as to any role for the
Secretary in the adjudication, dispute resolution, or enforcement of the
reasonable application requirement. Responsibility is placed on the three
Lower Basin States to "mutually agree" on reasonable applications of water.112
Congress conditioned enactment of the BCPA on approval by
California's legislature of an express and firm limitation to a maximum right
to 4.4 MAFY of the Colorado River.113 In addition, the BCPA had to be
ratified by six of the seven Upper and Lower Basin States.114 In the event
that one of the Lower Basin States other than California refused to ratify the

105.

Id. § 617.

106.

Id.

107.

Id.

108.

Id.

109. Id. § 617c(a). Arizona: 2.8 MAFY; California: 4.4 MAFY; Nevada: 300,000
AFY. An acre-foot is just under 327,000 gallons or the amount of water it takes to
cover an area the size of a football field one foot deep.
Id.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

113.

Id.

114.

Id.
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partition, Congress authorized the Secretary to operate, distribute, and
allocate the River's waters in the same fixed proportion.115
Section 5 of the BCPA authorized the Secretary to prescribe
regulations "to contract for the storage of water in said reservoir and for the
delivery thereof at such points on the river and on said canal as may be
agreed upon" so that the costs of construction, operation, and maintenance
can be recouped by the federal government.116 Section 5 also contains a
provision indicating that all contracts for irrigation and domestic purposes
"shall be for permanent service . . . ."117 Contracts must conform with section
4(a) and "[n]o person shall have or be entitled to have the use for any
purpose of the water stored as aforesaid except by contract . . . ."118
Section 5 makes no reference to reasonable, beneficial use. The
Secretarial regulations referenced are for the purpose of entering into
permanent contracts with users and for managing storage, delivery points,
and assuring federal financial recoupment. The permanence of all contracts
strongly undercuts any hint of a Secretarial role to deny water deliveries or
reallocate water inconsistent with permanent contractual priority. Similar to
section 10 of the Reclamation Act, section 5 authorizes the Secretary to
issue regulations for contracts for storage and delivery of Colorado River
water. But, the context of the section 5 authority is for the Secretary to issue
regulations for the purpose of entering storage and delivery contracts. No
express authority instructs the Secretary to make either annual intrastate
water use allocations or annual reasonable beneficial use adjudications.
The full extent of the section 5 contracting authority is properly framed by
the pragmatic federal interest to recoup infrastructure costs and ensure that
no state exceeds its legal maximum.
Section 6 cements the controlling purposes and priorities of the BCPA.
It prioritizes the purposes of use of the dam and reservoir listed in section 1:
river regulation, improvement of navigation and flood control, irrigation and
domestic uses, "satisfaction of present perfected rights in pursuance of
Article VIII of said Colorado River compact," and power production.119 Title,
control, management, and operation of the dams are expressly stipulated to
remain with the federal government120 and the general focus of the federal
role is on the maintenance and operation of the physical waterworks.
Section 14 coordinates the BCPA with the Reclamation Act, which is
expressly recognized as the primary law controlling "the construction,

115.

Id.

116.

Id. § 617d.

117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119.

Id. § 617e.

120.

Id.
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operation, and management" of the BCPA infrastructure, "except as
otherwise herein provided."121
Similarly, section 18 reaffirms the savings clause language of section 8
of the Reclamation Act, articulating federal recognition of state rights
specific to appropriation, control, and use of intrastate waters.122
Importantly, nothing in the BCPA abrogates the savings clause of section 8
of the Reclamation Act.
The BCPA contains no federal definition of reasonable, beneficial use
and does not identify any federal procedure to adjudicate reasonable,
beneficial use. There is no identified federal purpose and no necessity to
supplant state reasonable, beneficial use law, nor is there any language that
suggests a conflict with a continuing state role in reasonable, beneficial use
decisions. Instead, section 4 and section 18 reaffirm congressional intent to
limit the federal role pertaining to reasonable, beneficial use and
congressional preference for state law dominion.
The BCPA allowed California, with no Colorado tributary water of its
own, 4.4 MAFY plus half of any surplus and all unused entitlement by either
Arizona or Nevada. Arizona challenged the quantification of how its
tributary water would be accounted for in the broader formula. If the Gila
River was included as part of Arizona's 2.8 MAFY entitlement, Arizona would
only gain a secure right to 1.0 MAF of the Colorado River's main stem
waters. The differential of 1.8 MAF would allow California a perpetual right
to an additional 900,000 AF (roughly the same amount of extra water that
MWD used in the recent past and close to the volume of Priority 5 under the
Seven-Party Agreement). Arizona believed it was being shortchanged to
California's benefit and refused to ratify the BCPA.
Even without Arizona's ratification, section 4(a) of the BCPA expressly
authorized the Secretary to operate the Boulder Canyon Dam and distribute
the waters of the Colorado in accordance with the Congressional allocation,
if California ratified the 4.4 MAFY limit and five of the other six basin states
ratified the BCPA. California's legislature ratified the BCPA 4.4 MAFY limit
in 1929 with the passage of the California Limitation Act123 and the BCPA
shortly thereafter became law.

121.
122.

Id. § 617m.
Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such rights
as the States now have either to the waters within their borders or
to adopt such policies and enact such laws as they may deem
necessary with respect to the appropriation, control, and use of
waters within their borders, except as modified by the Colorado
River compact or other interstate agreement.

Id. § 617q (emphasis added).
123.
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3. Judicial Construction and the Law of the River
The term "cooperative federalism" has been used to define the
oscillating balance between state and federal control of intrastate water
resources. An early string of U.S. Supreme Court cases124 established a
presumption of federal deference to state control over water resources, but
in 1958, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken125 reversed course and signaled a
new period of federal encroachment upon state sovereignty.
a. Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken
Section 5 of the Reclamation Act expressly limits the use of
Reclamation water on irrigated acreage under single ownership to 160 acres.
California law did not recognize the same limitation on irrigated acreage.126
The lead issue in Ivanhoe was whether section 5 of the Reclamation Act
preempted California law. The California Supreme Court declared section 5
unconstitutional and invalidated the federally imposed acreage
limitations.127 The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the California high court,
holding that Congress's express limitation and specific language in section
5 preempted a contrary state law.128 It was a clear case of conflict
preemption where state law could not be reconciled with a conflicting
express federal purpose.
However, the Ivanhoe decision included critical dicta that tinted
subsequent interpretation of section8 of the Reclamation Act and triggered
the beginning of a dramatic erosion of state authority.129 Previous deference

124. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U.S. 40 (1935); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945); U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
125.

357 U.S. 275 (1958).

126.

Id. at 277-79.

127.
128.

Id. at 278-79.
We do not suggest that where Congress has provided a system
of regulation for federal projects it must give way before an
inconsistent state system.' Section 5 is a specific and mandatory
prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the
operation of reclamation projects, providing that '[n]o right to the
use of water . . . shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred
and sixty acres to any one landowner.

Id. at 291-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945)).
129.

We believe this erroneous insofar as the substantive provisions
of § 5 of the 1902 Act are concerned. As we read § 8, it merely
requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the
construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes
1525
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to state law in the domain of water supply management and water rights
regulation was fractured by a new distinction between the acquisition of
water rights, which were not impacted by reclamation law and which were
still governed by state law, and the operation and delivery of Reclamation
water, which was now subject to inconsistent state imposed conditions.130
While California maintained exclusive jurisdiction over appropriation and
allocation of water rights, it was no longer able to control or condition the
federal use or delivery of that water once the federal government acquired a
right to use water for reclamation purposes.
b. City of Fresno v. California
In 1963, City of Fresno v. California131 addressed whether Fresno could
enjoin the United States from diverting surface water for irrigation purposes
in contravention of two California laws that expressed a preference for
municipal uses over irrigation purposes and a preference for use of water
within its county of origin.132
Like the decision in Ivanhoe, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on express
Congressional language prioritizing reclamation water for irrigation133 over
other uses, in overruling the conflicting California preference for municipal
water. Fresno further eroded federal deference to state law by affirming the
dictum of the Ivanhoe decision and then by restricting state authority in
limiting or conditioning federal acquisition of water rights.134 The second lever
of state authority over water resources was taken away.

necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein.
But the acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the
operation of federal projects…We read nothing in § 8 that compels
the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the
State. To read § 8 to the contrary would require the Secretary to
violate § 5, the provisions of which, as we shall see, have been
national policy for over half a century.
Id. (emphasis added).
130.

Walston, supra note 72, at 1666-68.

131.

372 U.S. 627 (1963).

132.

Id. at 628.

133. "No contract relating to municipal water supply or miscellaneous
purposes shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary [of the Interior], it
will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes." Reclamation
Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187, 1194 (current version at 43 U.S.C.
§ 485h(c) (2003)).
134.
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c. Arizona v. California (1963)
As previously noted, Arizona did not ratify the BCPA apportionment of
the Lower Colorado and sued California to exclude the Gila River from the
Colorado River water accounting scheme.
The Colorado River Compact divided the waters between the Upper
and Lower Basins; the BCPA divided the waters among California, Arizona,
and Nevada; and the litigation in Arizona v. California135 resolved substantial
issues as to how the accounting for water allocation would be
implemented.136 A closely divided Supreme Court (5-3; Chief Justice Warren
did not participate) determined that equitable apportionment did not
govern allocation of the Colorado River since the BCPA was an express
comprehensive
Congressional
scheme
governing
interstate
apportionment.137 The primary holding divided the river in a 4.4/2.8/0.3 ratio
among California, Arizona, and Nevada respectively, and excluded the
tributary flow of the Gila River from Arizona's 2.8 MAFY.138 Arizona had won.
The Arizona decision also resolved an important secondary issue
regarding the extent to which the Secretary was bound by state law when
entering into contracts to allocate and distribute the waters of the Colorado
River with contractors of each state. Most importantly for understanding the
present Part 417 contention, the Supreme Court examined the Secretary's
section 5 contract authority through the provisions of sections 14 and 18 of
the BCPA and section 8 of the Reclamation Act to determine if state law
could limit the Secretary's ability to enter the congressionally-required water
delivery contracts.139 The Arizona Court held that the BCPA authorized the

of § 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the
property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made.
Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630.
135.

373 U.S. 546 (1963).

136.

An essential reference is Charles J. Meyers’ The Colorado River, supra note 95.

137.

373 U.S. at 560, 575-90.

138.

Id. at 592-93.

139.

Nor does § 18 of the Project Act require the Secretary to contract
according to state law. That Act was passed in the exercise of
congressional power to control navigable water for purposes of
flood control, navigation, power generation, and other objects,
and is equally sustained by the power of Congress to promote the
general welfare through projects for reclamation, irrigation, or
other internal improvements. Section 18 merely preserves such
rights as the States 'now' have, that is, such rights as they had at
the time the Act was passed. While the States were generally free
to exercise some jurisdiction over these waters before the Act was
passed, this right was subject to the Federal Government's right to
1527
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Secretary to implement the interstate water apportionment exclusively
through water delivery contracts and these contracts were to be the sole
method for contractors to acquire waters impounded behind the federal
dams on the Lower Colorado River.
The Court affirmed that the BCPA expressly incorporated Reclamation
Law, which itself recognized that state law governed the "control,
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation." However,
Ivanhoe and Fresno emerged as prominent authority within Arizona140 to
expansively strip states of regulatory authority over water allocation and
distribution from the Colorado River, previously and expressly conferred by
the Reclamation Act. The Supreme Court relied on Ivanhoe for the
proposition that the federal government was not bound by state law in
delivering or distributing reclamation water141 and held that the Secretary "in
choosing between users within each State and in settling the terms of his
contracts is not bound . . . to follow state law."142 The Supreme Court

regulate and develop the river. Where the Government, as here,
has exercised this power and undertaken a comprehensive project
for the improvement of a great river and for the orderly and beneficial
distribution of water, there is no room for inconsistent state laws. As in
Ivanhoe, where the general provision preserving state law was held
not to override a specific provision stating the terms for
disposition of the water, here we hold that the general saving
language of § 18 cannot bind the Secretary by state law and thereby nullify
the contract power expressly conferred upon him by § 5. Section 18 plainly
allows the States to do things not inconsistent with the Project Act or with
federal control of the river, for example, regulation of the use of
tributary water and protection of present perfected rights. What
other things the States are free to do can be decided when the
occasion arises. But where the Secretary's contracts, as here, carry out a
congressional plan for the complete distribution of waters to users, state law has
no place.
373 U.S. at 587-88 (emphasis added).
140.

Id. at 546.

141. "Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act did not subject the Secretary to state
law in disposing of water in that case, we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold
that the Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the Project
Act." Id. at 587.
142.
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Section 14 provides that the reclamation law, to which the Act is
made a supplement, shall govern the management of the works
except as otherwise provided, and § 8 of the Reclamation Act,
much like § 18 of the Project Act, provides that it is not to be
construed as affecting or interfering with state laws 'relating to the
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
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emphasized that "where the Secretary's contracts, as here, carry out a
congressional plan for the complete distribution of waters to users, state law
has no place."143 State law could not impede congressional intent or limit
the Secretary's contracting authority.
Justice Black linked the fundamental Congressional objective of
section 5 with the concern that Arizona would not accept the federally
outlined and "suggested" apportionment among states.144
Congress
expressly imposed its own "statutory apportionment" formula for division of
waters among the states and expressly authorized the Secretary to apportion
waters among Lower Basin States according to section 4(a) of the BCPA145
and to allocate each state portion among users.146
Evaluating the extent and limit on the Secretary's section 5
contracting authority, the Supreme Court stated, "authority is no less than
the general authority, unless Congress has placed some limit on it."147
Justice Black concluded:
[there is] no phrase or provision indicating that the
Secretary's contract power was to be controlled by the law
of prior appropriation was substituted either then or at
any other time before passage of the Act, and we are
persuaded that had Congress intended so to fetter the
Secretary's discretion, it would have done so in clear and
unequivocal terms, as it did in recognizing "present
perfected rights" in § 6.148

irrigation . . . .' In our view, nothing in any of these provisions
affects our decision, stated earlier, that it is the Act and the
Secretary's contracts, not the law of prior appropriation, that control the
apportionment of water among the States. Moreover, contrary to
the Master's conclusion, we hold that the Secretary in choosing
between users within each State and in settling the terms of his
contracts is not bound by these sections to follow state law.
Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added) (brackets in original).
143.

Id. at 588.

144.

Id. at 579.

145.

4.4/2.8/0.3 MAFY for each state respectively.

146. "Congress made sure, however, that if the States did not agree on any
compact the objects of the Act would be carried out, for the Secretary would then
proceed, by making contracts, to apportion water among the States and to allocate
the water among users within each State." 373 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added).
147.

Id. at 580.

148.

Id. at 581.
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Justice Black summarized the BCPA as giving the Secretary sufficient
power to permanently allocate water "among states and among users within
each State without regard to the law of prior appropriation."149 Concluding
the section of his analysis titled "ALLOCATION OF WATER AMONG THE
STATES AND DISTRIBUTION TO USERS,"150 he framed the scope of federal
interests within the concept of cooperative federalism.
In taking
responsibility for the harnessing of the Colorado River through a "great
complex" of public works, the United States had an underlying interest to
"make certain that the waters were effectively used." The "vast, interlocking
machinery" could only function under unitary federal management, which
was uniquely capable of synthesizing and coordinating the competitive
interests of the states.151 The Secretary was thus empowered to operate this
machinery and contract in such a way as to avoid the "possibly inconsistent
commands of the different state legislatures" and to allocate and distribute
the Colorado River's water.152
Despite a vociferous dissent, Arizona significantly strengthened federal
authority over water allocation and distribution, and decisively tipped the
balance between state and federal authority in section 8 of the Reclamation
Act towards dominant federal control.
d. 1964 Arizona Decree
A 1964 Supreme Court decree153 following the Arizona v. California
decision, defined key terms from the 1963 decision and the growing lexicon
of the Law of the River. "Perfected right"154 and "present perfected rights"155
were to be protected as senior priorities on an interstate level in times of

149.

Id. at 581.

150.

Id. at 564.

151.

Id. at 589.

152.

Id. at 589-90.

153.
154.

Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
(G) 'Perfected right' means a water right acquired in accordance
with state law, which right has been exercised by the actual
diversion of a specific quantity of water that has been applied to a
defined area of land or to definite municipal or industrial works,
and in addition shall include water rights created by the
reservation of mainstream water for the use of federal
establishments under federal law whether or not the water has
been applied to beneficial use.

Id. at 341.
155. "(H) 'Present perfected rights' means perfected rights, as here defined,
existing as of June 25, 1929, the effective date of the Boulder Canyon Project Act." Id.
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insufficient water to satisfy the full Lower Basin legal apportionment of 7.5
MAF.156 The Decree required the "satisfaction of present perfected rights in
the order of their priority date without regard to state lines,"157 utilizing a
traditional prior appropriation shortage formula similar to the Supreme
Court decision in Wyoming.
The Decree also directed the Lower Basin states to quantify and
identify "present perfected rights" which had been established before the
passage of the BCPA. 158 All water rights perfected would be placed in one of
two baskets, either before or after 1929, and the Secretary would first satisfy
those rights established prior to 1929.159 It also reinforced the Secretary's
water delivery contracting authority as the only valid method for any Lower
Basin contractor to receive water from the Colorado River.160

156.

(3) If insufficient mainstream water is available for release, as
determined by the Secretary of the Interior, to satisfy annual
consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet in the aforesaid three
States, then the Secretary of the Interior, after providing for
satisfaction of present perfected rights in the order of their priority
dates without regard to state lines and after consultation with the
parties to major delivery contracts and such representatives as
the respective States may designate, may apportion the amount
remaining available for consumptive use in such manner as is
consistent with the Boulder Canyon Project Act as interpreted by
the opinion of this Court herein, and with other applicable
federal statutes, but in no event shall more than 4,400,000 acrefeet be apportioned for use in California including all present
perfected rights.

Id. at 341-42.
157.

Id. at 342.

158.

Id. at 351.

159.
160.

Id. at 341-43.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs (1) through (4)
of this subdivision (B), mainstream water shall be released or
delivered to water users (including but not limited to public and
municipal corporations and other public agencies) in Arizona,
California, and Nevada only pursuant to valid contracts therefor
made with such users by the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to
Section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act or any other
applicable federal statute.

Id. at 343.
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e. California v. United States
In 1978, for the first time since Arizona, the State of California and
BuRec again clashed over their respective roles and authority under the
Reclamation Act. In California v. United States,161 the issue was whether the
SWRCB could lawfully attach conditions to its approval of appropriation
permit applications from BuRec regarding acquisition of water rights needed
to store water of the Stanislaus River behind the federally owned New
Melones Dam.162
The SWRCB had conditioned the acquisition of the water right by
BuRec upon compliance with a California law that required the appropriated
waters to be used both "reasonably" and "beneficially."163 The SWRCB did
not deny the federal application to appropriate water, but it would not grant
a permit in advance of the submittal of a "specific plan" for the use of the
water so that the SWRCB could ensure compliance with state reasonable,
beneficial use law. BuRec had no advance contracts in place for water
delivery or use, and thus could not comply with the SWRCB condition that a
specific plan be submitted.
BuRec challenged the SWRCB's authority to impose any conditions,164
since it considered the water rights appropriation application and permit
issuance process a mere formality. BuRec argued that Ivanhoe, Fresno, and
Arizona had diminished state authority over appropriation and distribution of
water for federal projects and therefore there was no role left for the SWRCB
for federal projects with respect to defining and enforcing state reasonable,
beneficial use requirements.
Justice Rehnquist began the analysis at the 1902 Reclamation Act and
traced a "consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state
water law by Congress."165 Congress intended that "authority over intrastate
waterways lies with the States."166 As originally conceived, the blueprint for
cooperative federalism between state and federal roles was most clearly
delineated through Secretarial control and management of the "construction

161.
162.
note 72.
163.

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
Id. at 647, 652; Kelley, Staging a Comeback, supra note 72; Walston, supra
California, 438 U.S. at 652-654.

164. United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
California, 509 F. Supp 867 (E.D. Cal. 1981); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978); United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. California,
403 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1975); see also Kelley, Staging a Comeback, supra note 72.
165.

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).

166.

Id. at 662.
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and operation167 of reclamation projects, while state law would govern the
realm of "appropriation and later distribution" of water.168 State law
controlled the distribution of water once it was released from a federal
dam,169 since a "principal motivating factor"170 for federal deference to state
law was the legal confusion that would inhere if both sets of laws operated
"side by side."171
Nonetheless, federal deference was not a blank check for states to do
as they wished with reclamation water. Express provisions, such as the
section 8 reasonable, beneficial use requirement, the preference for
irrigation use, and the 160-acre irrigation maximum limited intrastate use of
reclamation water.172 The court noted the overriding message of the
Reclamation Act was silence and omission, reflecting a fundamental intent
to restrict federal authority from inception.
After recounting this early history, the more recent incongruity of
Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona posed a formidable task for judicial reconciliation.
Weighing the legislative language and subsequent history, it became
apparent that a clear expression of section 8 intent to uphold state
sovereignty with regard to appropriation and distribution had been radically
turned on its head, eroding a cornerstone of state authority. California
asked the court to reassert the primacy of the states' authority,173 while
BuRec argued that recent Supreme Court language had stripped states of
that authority.
The issues in Ivanhoe and Fresno were characterized as particular
conflicts between express federal directives and contrary provisions of
California law (160-acre limit and reclamation preference for irrigation over
municipal uses of water).174 Thus, the distinction between acquisition and

167.

Id. at 664.

168.

Id.

169.

Id. at 665-67.

170.

Id. at 668.

171.

Id. at 668-69.

172.

Id. at 668 n.21.

173. "Petitioners instead ask us to hold that a State may impose any condition
on the ‘control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water’ through a federal
reclamation project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional directives
respecting the project." Id. at 672.
174.

While we are not convinced that the above language is
diametrically inconsistent with the position of petitioners, or that
it squarely supports the United States, it undoubtedly goes further
than was necessary to decide the cases presented to the Court.
Ivanhoe and City of Fresno involved conflicts between § 8, requiring
the Secretary to follow state law as to water rights, and other
1533
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distribution within Ivanhoe was recognized as dictum and discarded. This
removed a critical linchpin from the subsequent dicta in Fresno which had
limited state authority over appropriation.
Similarly, the Court narrowly construed the holding in Arizona to an
issue of whether state law could control the distribution of water in a multistate reclamation project.175 Congress had specifically empowered the
Secretary to enter permanent delivery contracts, free from state limitations
or conditions, to ensure that the distribution of Colorado River water among
the Lower Basin states and within each state was consistent with
congressional allocation. The Arizona Court borrowed the dictum from
Ivanhoe and Fresno as to the scope of section 8, but there was "no need for it
to reaffirm such language except as it related to the singular legislative
history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act."176
Rehnquist specifically distinguished the express Congressional
authorization to consolidate interstate contracting authority in the Secretary
for the Colorado River from a Congressional grant of unlimited power to the
Secretary to dictate contract terms relating to distribution of all waters
without accommodation for state conditions.177 The apportioned distribution
of the main stem waters of the Colorado River between interstate
appropriators was Congress's express intent under the BCPA. The opinion
in California discarded the distinction between acquisition and distribution
and undercut the decision in Arizona that state law had no role when the
BCPA and Reclamation Act were reconciled alongside one another. On the
contrary, the Reclamation Act preempted the BCPA.
Rehnquist identified the essence of the previous holdings: "state water
law does not control in the distribution of reclamation water if inconsistent
with other congressional directives to the Secretary."178 The section 8
savings clause in the Reclamation Act would not be brushed aside lightly,
nor would the Court need to reverse its prior holdings. However, state
authority still needed to be reconciled with the Secretary's express BCPA
section 5 contract authority. The core issue boiled down to the context and
syntax of acquisition and distribution of water within the Colorado River
system and the broader reclamation program. The immediate context at

provisions of Reclamation Acts that placed specific limitations on
how the water was to be distributed. Here the United States
contends that it may ignore state law even if no explicit
congressional directive conflicts with the conditions imposed by
the California State Water Control Board.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 674.

176.

Id.

177.

Id. at 673-75.

178.

Id. at 668 n.21.
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issue in the Arizona opinion was distribution by the Secretary to interstate
recipients, while the acquisition of the water was expressly solved by
Congress's apportionment between sibling states.
The California opinion reconciled the two extremes of interpretation
and recognized a section 5 federal power to veto state distributions of
reclamation water, but it did not find language that permitted the Secretary
to limit distribution of water beyond the BCPA section 4(a) language
authorizing permanent water allocations. The ultimate purpose of the BCPA
is to allocate and distribute the waters of the Colorado River and force the
State of California into a permanent quantified limit for the benefit of
California's uneasy neighbors. It was not to usurp state authority.
The Supreme Court concluded that section 8 authorized states to
govern the substance of water supply distribution.179 Returning to the
beneficial use standard within section 8 and the absence of any
Congressional language within the BCPA limiting section 8, there was a
strong implication that Congress was not concerned about the "possibly
inconsistent" state commands once water was delivered within a state and
exclusively applied intrastate. The integrity of state authority under section
8's reasonable, beneficial use clause, the Congressional purpose of the
BCPA, and the Secretary's section 5 contract authority could stand alongside
each other and govern separate aspects of water allocation and distribution
on the Lower Colorado.
The California opinion resurrected state authority in the domain of
"control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water"180 on federal

179.
180.

Id. at 678.
But because there is at least tension between the above-quoted
dictum and what we conceive to be the correct reading of § 8 of
the Reclamation Act of 1902, we disavow the dictum to the extent that
it would prevent petitioners from imposing conditions on the
permit granted to the United States which are not inconsistent
with congressional provisions authorizing the project in question.
Section 8 cannot be read to require the Secretary to comply with
state law only when it becomes necessary to purchase or
condemn vested water rights. That section does, of course,
provide for the protection of vested water rights, but it also requires
the Secretary to comply with state law in the “control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water.” Nor, as the United States contends, does § 8
merely require the Secretary of the Interior to file a notice with the
State of his intent to appropriate but to thereafter ignore the
substantive provisions of state law. The legislative history of the
Reclamation Act of 1902 makes it abundantly clear that Congress
intended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state
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reclamation projects. The creeping judicial distinctions and dicta from three
successive cases, which had reversed a tradition of cooperative federalism,
were effectively trimmed to restore the original balance between state and
federal authorities.
f. 1979 Arizona Decree
Per the 1964 Decree, the three Lower Basin States were brought back
before the Supreme Court to outline and establish a quantified table of
present perfected rights.181 In accord with the Reclamation Act, the 1979
Decree reiterated that "[a]ny water right listed herein may be exercised only
for beneficial uses."182 It also quantified IID's present perfected rights with a
maximum and a formula,183 but it did not elaborate on how or whether
federal or state law would define beneficial use, what processes should be
utilized, or address any maximum reasonable beneficial use "duty" on IID.
g. Bryant v. Yellen
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Bryant v. Yellen, addressed the issue of
whether irrigated private lands that exceeded 160 acres before the passage
of the Reclamation Act were exempt from the 160-acre reclamation
limitation on irrigation deliveries. 184 Importantly, the Supreme Court rooted
present perfected rights within state water law185 and identified a clear role

water law. The Government's interpretation would trivialize the
broad language and purpose of § 8.
Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added).
181.

Arizona, 439 U.S. 419 (1979).

182.

Id. at 421.

183.

The Imperial Irrigation District in annual quantities not to exceed
(i) 2,600,000 acre-feet of diversions from the mainstream or (ii) the
quantity of mainstream water necessary to supply the
consumptive use required for irrigation of 424,145 acres and for
the satisfaction of related uses, whichever of (i) or (ii) is less, with
a priority date of 1901.

Id. at 429.
184.
185.
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447 U.S. 352 (1980).
In the first place, it bears emphasizing that the § 6 perfected
right is a water right originating under state law. In Arizona v.
California, we held that the Project Act vested in the Secretary the
power to contract for project water deliveries independent of the
direction of § 8 of the Reclamation Act to proceed in accordance
with state law and of the admonition of § 18 of the Project Act not
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for state law in "determining the content and characteristics of the water
right that was adjudicated to the District by our decree."186 The Court carved
out a protected haven for present perfected rights from federal controls and
restraints associated with the BCPA.187
4.

Conclusion: Limits on Federal Beneficial Use Authority

Decided only six months after Fresno, the Arizona v. California opinion is
an unquestioned landmark in the Law of the River and remains the lead
authority for interpretation of the BCPA.188 However, the impact of California
on Arizona is the most critical cog in the analysis of whether the Secretary, by
regulation after entering permanent service contracts, can preempt state
reasonable, beneficial use laws and procedures.
The Supreme Court addressed the section 5 contractual authority of
the Secretary related to interstate allocations of the Colorado River in Arizona
and the federal-state balance of section 8 authority in California. As
discussed above, California explicitly disavowed dicta from two prominent
section 8 cases, Ivanhoe and Fresno, diminishing reliance on Arizona as
authority to justify federal displacement of state law.
California unambiguously validated a state role in both acquisition and
distribution, specifically related to reasonable beneficial use, and strikes
inconsistent aspects of the Arizona holding. California affirmed SWRCB
authority to impose and condition a beneficial use requirement on the

to interfere with state law. . . . We nevertheless clearly recognized
that § 6 of the Project Act, requiring satisfaction of present
perfected rights, was an unavoidable limitation on the Secretary's
power and that in providing for these rights the Secretary must
take account of state law. In this respect, state law was not
displaced by the Project Act and must be consulted in
determining the content and characteristics of the water right that
was adjudicated to the District by our decree.
Id. at 370-71.
186.
187.

Id. at 371.
Here, we are dealing with perfected rights protected by the Project
Act; and because its water rights are to be interpreted in the light of
state law, the District should now be as free of land limitations with
respect to the land it was irrigating in 1929 as it was prior to the
passage of the Project Act. To apply § 46 would go far toward
emasculating the substance, under state law, of the water right
decreed to the District, as well as substantially limiting its duties to,
and the rights of, the farmer-beneficiaries in the District.

Id. at 373-74.
188.

Arizona, 373 U.S. 546, 551 (1963).
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acquisition of water by BuRec. Arizona and section 5, therefore, cannot be
the basis for Secretarial authority to impose reasonable, beneficial use
restrictions or deny the role of state law and a state authority over
reasonable, beneficial use disputes. Arizona is not authority to supplant
applicable California reasonable, beneficial use law and procedures.
At the same time, while section 8 expressly articulates a federal
requirement of reasonable, beneficial use for water distribution governing
all reclamation projects, the language falls far short of the necessary depth
or breadth to establish a federal standard which can be distinguished from
applicable state law. At every possible juncture, the meat of express
legislative language is left off the bone. If state law evidenced the outright
absence of a state beneficial use standard and adjudication process, one
might infer greater leeway for a federal role to implement the express
requirement of section 8. However, California has substantial constitutional, statutory, judicial, and administrative authorities that explicitly
govern reasonable, beneficial use. There is no vacuum for federal authority
to fill and the Supreme Court has identified no preemptive basis to do so.
C. California Beneficial Use Laws
Conflict preemption analysis also requires an analysis of California law
and process to determine whether a direct conflict exists with federal law or
whether California law or process thwarts the Congressional intent of the
previously discussed federal law. As outlined on remand of California, "[a]
state statute or regulation is preempted by a federal rule 'to the extent it
conflicts with a federal statute' or where it stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."189 If conflict is not found, California's beneficial use law will be
presumed to stand.
1. Constitutional and Statutory Authority
In 1928, just before the BCPA was passed, article X, section 2 of the
California Constitution was enacted by the California legislature.190
Common law reasonable, beneficial use definitions were expressly
consolidated through one overarching governing standard.
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the
water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste

United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1982).

190.

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
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or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be
exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in
or from any natural stream or water course in this State is
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required
for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and
shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.191
Since 1928, California's legislature has articulated nuanced statutory
details of how reasonable, beneficial use, waste, and unreasonable use are
to be measured and determined.192 For example, statutes identify the limit
of an appropriated water right, when it ceases, and the process whereby a
right reverts to the public.193 "Conserved water" is a recognized reasonable,

191.

Id. (emphasis added).

192. California's Water Code was created by the state legislature in 1943, but
has statutory roots dating back to the Civil Code of 1872.
193.

Purpose of appropriation; cessation of right: The appropriation
must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the
appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such a
purpose the right ceases.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1240 (West 2008);
Reversion of unused water: When the person entitled to the use of
water fails to use beneficially all or any part of the water claimed
by him, for which a right of use has vested, for the purpose for
which it was appropriated or adjudicated, for a period of five
years, such unused water may revert to the public and shall, if
reverted, be regarded as unappropriated public water. Such
reversion shall occur upon a finding by the board following notice to
the permittee and a public hearing if requested by the permittee.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West 2008);
Beneficial use of water: It is hereby declared that because of the
conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires
that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented,
and that the conservation of such water is to be exercised with a
view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the
people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use
or flow of water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in
1539
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beneficial use, preventing conserved water from being classified as waste
and subject to possible forfeiture, which provides an important incentive for
cooperation by water rights holders.194 In addition, California expressly
recognizes the use of water for recreation, fish, and wildlife values as
beneficial uses.195 The California legislature has articulated specific factors

this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right
does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.
CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2008) (emphasis added);
Prevention of unreasonable use of water: The department and
board shall take all appropriate proceedings or actions before
executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent waste,
unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use, or unreasonable
method of diversion of water in this state.
CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 2008).
194.

Appropriated water rights; cessation or reduction in use;
forfeiture; transfer; reversion of rights: (a) When any person
entitled to the use of water under an appropriative right fails to
use all or any part of the water because of water conservation
efforts, any cessation or reduction in the use of the appropriated
water shall be deemed equivalent to a reasonable beneficial use
of water to the extent of the cessation or reduction in use. No
forfeiture of the appropriative right to the water conserved shall
occur upon the lapse of the forfeiture period applicable to water
appropriated pursuant to the Water Commission Act or this code
or the forfeiture period applicable to water appropriated prior to
December 19, 1914.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West 2008).
195.

1540

Recreation; preservation of fish and wildlife resources: The use
of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement of fish
and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of water. In determining
the amount of water available for appropriation for other
beneficial uses, the board shall take into account, whenever it is in
the public interest, the amounts of water required for
recreation and the preservation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife resources. The board shall notify the Department of
Fish and Game of any application for a permit to appropriate
water. The Department of Fish and Game shall recommend the
amounts of water, if any, required for the preservation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife resources and shall report its
findings to the board. This section shall not be construed to
affect riparian rights.
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governing what beneficial uses must be considered and how these beneficial
uses are to be synthesized into a final determination by the SWRCB.196
2. Judicial Authority
The breadth and depth of California judicial opinions add significant
substance to the California law of reasonable, beneficial use. Herminghaus v.
Southern California Edison Co.197 held that use of water by a downstream
riparian to flood pastureland was a protected beneficial use of state water
with priority over a proposed upstream appropriation for a power project.
Even though the flood waters benefited few people relative to the net
benefit provided by the proposed power project, the court did not strike at
the reasonableness of the beneficial riparian use of water. The case
precipitated the adoption of the Constitutional amendment embodied in
article X, section2. Priority of right no longer precluded an evaluation of
the reasonableness or the degree of beneficial use among competing water
right holders.
In 1935, the Peabody v. Vallejo198 decision evaluated the question of
unreasonableness, waste, and beneficial use of water by a riparian who used
the entire flow of a river to flood his lands with restorative silts. After
contemplating a set of facts roughly similar to Herminghaus, the court
dissected the asserted right by the riparian to the "full flood flow" of the
stream with the new article X, section 2 standard of reasonableness.199 The

CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 2008).
196.

Consideration of relative benefit: In acting upon applications to
appropriate water, the board shall consider the relative benefit to
be derived from (1) all beneficial uses of the water concerned
including, but not limited to, use for domestic, irrigation,
municipal, industrial, preservation and enhancement of fish and
wildlife, recreational, mining and power purposes, and any uses
specified to be protected in any relevant water quality control
plan, and (2) the reuse or reclamation of the water sought to be
appropriated, as proposed by the applicant. The board may
subject such appropriations to such terms and conditions as in its
judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public
interest, the water sought to be appropriated.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1257 (West 2008).
197.

Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison, 252 P. 607, 619-20 (Cal. 1926).

198.

Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1935).

199. "A stream supply may be divided but the product of the division in
nowise remains the same. When the supply is limited; public interest requires that
there be the greatest number of beneficial uses which the supply can yield." Id. at
491;
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Court decided the law no longer supported continued and unreasonable
use.200 As a result, no water right within the state was exempt from the

...
1. The right to the use of water is limited to such water as shall be
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served. 2. Such right
does not extend to the waste of water. 3. Such right does not
extend to unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water. 4. Riparian rights attach to, but to no
more than so much of the flow as may be required or used
consistently with this section of the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added);
...
As to what is waste water depends on the circumstances of each
case and the time when waste is required to be prevented. In
sections of the state, few in number, where the rivers and streams
are plentifully supplied, and there is no need for the conservation of
the product thereof, the water flows freely to the sea. When
needed for beneficial uses it may be stored or restrained by
appropriation subject to the rights of those who have a lawful
priority in a reasonable beneficial use. That priority has been subjected
to limitations and regulations prescribed by the Constitution, but
it has by no means been abolished. Under the new policy the
vested right theory, that is, the right of the riparian owner to all of
the waters of the stream, as it is wont to flow in the state of
nature, and without regard to the reasonableness of such use as
against an appropriator, has been subjected to such limitations
that the old doctrine . . . is no longer the law of this state.
Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
...
[T]he rule of reasonable use as enjoined by section 3 of article XIV
[now Article X, Section 2] of the Constitution applies to all water
rights enjoyed or asserted in this state, whether the same be
grounded on the riparian right or the right, analogous to the
riparian right, of the overlying land owner, or the percolating water
right, or the appropriative right.
Id. at 498-99 (emphasis added).
200.
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The asserted right of a riparian owner, whose lands in a state of
nature form a delta at about sea level, to have the full flood flow
of the stream to overflow his lands for the purpose of depositing
silt thereon, or by artificial check dams and levees to remove the
saline content of the soil which in a state of nature are salt marsh
lands, cannot be supported. So far as we are advised, this asserted
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sweeping purpose of article X, section2, and all water users were put on notice
that the state would no longer consider past use as a presumptive safe harbor
with absolute immunity from reasonable beneficial use evaluation.201
Additional case law refined and illustrated the limits of beneficial use.
At issue in Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District202 was
the reasonableness of the use of water to flush out and drown gophers that
damaged overlying crops. The court discussed the growing needs of an
expanding population in terms of a dynamic, non-static variable in the
beneficial use analysis, and described how beneficial uses of one era could
gradually displace and outweigh established uses from another.203 The court
distinguished a quantity of water considered to be an "excessive diversion"
above the amount required for "reasonably necessary" use204 and specified

right does not inhere in the riparian right at common law, and as a
natural right cannot be asserted as against the police power of the
state in the conservation of its waters. This asserted right involves
an unreasonable use or an unreasonable method of use or an unreasonable
method of diversion of water as contemplated by the Constitution.
Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
201.

[T]he rule of reasonable use as enjoined by section 3 of article
XIV [now Article X, Section 2] of the Constitution applies to all
water rights enjoyed or asserted in this state, whether the same be
grounded on the riparian right or the right, analogous to the
riparian right, of the overlying land owner, or the percolating water
right, or the appropriative right.

Id. at 498-99.
202.
1935).
203.

Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
As the pressure of population has led to the attempt to bring
under cultivation more and more lands, and as the demands for
water to irrigate these lands have become more and more
pressing, the decisions have become increasingly emphatic in
limiting the appropriator to the quantity reasonably necessary for
beneficial uses.

Id. at 997 (italics added).
204.

If the appropriator uses more than the amount so required, he
gains no right thereto. An excessive diversion of water for any
purpose cannot be regarded as a diversion for a beneficial use.
In so far as the diversion exceeds the amount reasonably necessary
for beneficial purposes, it is contrary to the policy of the law and
is a taking without right and confers no title, no matter for how
long continued.

Id. (emphasis added).
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that the measuring standard was not "the most scientific method known,"
but instead would generally be established by local custom.205
Tulare did not eliminate senior priority rights based on waste and
instead injected an element of beneficial use flexibility to protect farmers
and irrigators who could not afford to keep pace with the "most scientific
method" of diversion or maintain the most modern distribution systems. 206
The Court clearly recognized the importance of increased economic utility
and the need to avoid waste as core beneficial use considerations.
However, neither consideration could be applied absolutely to a beneficial
use determination to unilaterally preempt and usurp local customs and
water control.207
In 1967, Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water Dist.208 broadened the scope of
reasonable, beneficial use review to include "statewide considerations of
transcendent importance."209 A riparian plaintiff sought to enjoin the
construction of a dam, since the diminished flows below the dam prevented

205. "However, an appropriator cannot be compelled to divert according to the
most scientific method known. He is entitled to make a reasonable use of the water
according to the general custom of the locality, so long as the custom does not
involve unnecessary waste." Id. (emphasis added).
206.
207.

Id.
There can be no doubt that respondents as a group do not
divert the water in the most scientific manner. There can be no
doubt that in some cases, because of the paralleling of the ditches
of some of the respondents, there is an uneconomic use of water.
If all of the respondents constituted one appropriating unit, then
perhaps there would be some merit in appellant's contention that
respondents' methods are wasteful.
But these various
appropriators are not one unit—each one has its own
appropriative right, gained by many years of use. The courts
cannot and, even if they had the power, should not compel these
appropriators, many of whom have been diverting water for over
fifty years, at their expense, to build new systems of diversion.

Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
208.
209.

Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967).
Although, as we have said, what is a reasonable use of water
depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry
cannot be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of
transcendent importance. Paramount among these we see the ever
increasing need for the conservation of water in this state, an
inescapable reality of life quite apart from its express recognition
in the 1928 amendment.

Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
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the beneficial recharge of gravels and other sediments on the riparian's
property. The court evaluated the growing list of beneficial use factors to
ascertain whether such use of water was beneficial and concluded that the
use of unfettered flows to restore gravel beds could not be treated as a
reasonable, beneficial use.210
Similarly, in SWRCB v. Forni,211 the court considered whether or not the
beneficial diversion and use of water from the Napa River for the purpose of
frost protection was unreasonable. Encountering a need to differentiate
distinctions between beneficial uses that could also be deemed
unreasonable, as in Joslin, the Court announced "the overriding
constitutional consideration is to put the water resources of the state to a
reasonable use and make them available for the constantly increasing needs
of all the people." The court explained that "[I]n order to attain this
objective, the riparian owners may properly be required to endure some
inconvenience or to incur reasonable expenses."212 A showing of beneficial
use can only be supported if the underlying usage is reasonable. If a use is
beneficial, yet unreasonable, the use cannot stand.213
One year later, in Environmental Defense Fund v. EBMUD (I),214 a public
interest plaintiff sought to enjoin the construction of a canal which would
change the point of diversion in the Lower American River and thereby harm
a fall run of Chinook salmon. Although the case was later overruled and
remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court, the state court emphasized the

210.

On the other hand, unlike the unanimous policy
pronouncements relative to the use and conservation of natural
waters, we are aware of none relative to the supply and availability
of sand, gravel and rock in commercial quantities. Plaintiffs do
not urge that the general welfare or public interest requires that
particular or exceptional measures be employed to insure that
such natural resources be made generally available and should
therefore be carefully conserved.

Id. at 894-95 (emphasis added).
211.

State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855-56 (Ct. App. 1976).

212.

Id. at 856.

213.

[T]he claim that respondents' use of water is beneficial does not
bring it within the constitutional postulate of reasonableness. As
emphasized in Joslin, “beneficial use” cannot be equated with
“reasonable use,” and “the mere fact that a use may be beneficial to
a riparian's lands is not sufficient if the use is not also reasonable
within the meaning of section 3 of article XIV [now Article X,
Section 2] . . . .” (Joslin, 429 P.2d 889).

Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
214.

Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 572 P.2d 1128 (Cal. 1977).
1545

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

necessity to evaluate the entire circumstances, more so when
"transcendent interests of public health and safety beyond normal water
use are involved."215
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court216 added the "public trust
doctrine" to California reasonable, beneficial use considerations.217 The case
centered on the reasonableness of water diversions from non-navigable
tributary streams feeding Mono Lake. The court commented that article X,
section 2 establishes that "[a]ll uses of water, including public trust uses,
must now conform to the standard of reasonable use."218 The court noted
the obvious dependence of the population and economy "upon the
appropriation of vast quantities of water for uses unrelated to in-stream
trust values."219 The court also recognized a new component of reasonable,
beneficial use insofar as "it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right
to appropriate water in a manner harmful to interests protected by the
public trust."220
The judiciary acted as the state guardian to protect fish, wildlife, and
recreational values from the sometimes mechanical application of economic
analysis and beneficial utility.221 The public trust doctrine precludes
reasonable beneficial use determinations from omitting consideration of
public trust values. Yet the court pragmatically acknowledged the difficulty
in weighing and balancing these considerations:

215.

Id. at 1137.

216.

658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).

217. Three excellent resources to introduce Public Trust Doctrine are: Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970); Harrison C. Dunning, The Significance of California's Public
Trust Easement for California's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1980); and
Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text, and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST.
L.J 1155 (1996).
218.

658 P.2d at 725.

219.

Id. at 727.

220.

Id.

221.

The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to
protect public trust uses whenever feasible. Just as the history of
this state shows that appropriation may be necessary for efficient
use of water despite unavoidable harm to public trust values, it
demonstrates that an appropriative water rights system
administered without consideration of the public trust may cause
unnecessary and unjustified harm to trust interests.

Id. at 728.
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As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to
approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public
trust uses. In so doing, however, the state must bear in
mind its duty as trustee to consider the effect of the taking
on the public trust [citation omitted] and to preserve, so far
as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by
the trust.222
United States v. SWRCB recognized water-quality impacts as relevant to
reasonable, beneficial use determinations.223 The case arose in the context
of state efforts to regulate water quality in the Bay Delta. The court
referenced reasonable, beneficial use as the "cardinal principle"224 of
California water law and recognized SWRCB regulatory authority to prevent
uses that unreasonably harm water quality. SWRCB authority included the
evaluation of the "relative benefit" to be derived from competing uses of
water, even those which are beneficial and reasonable, but which become
less so when water quality impacts are considered.225 The SWRCB decision
reaffirms the broad authority226 to modify permits on the basis that
previously reasonable, beneficial uses of water had become unreasonable.227

222.

Id.

223.

United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).

224.
225.

Id. at 171.
Moreover, the power of the Board to set permit terms and
conditions (§ 1253) includes the power to consider the “relative
benefit” to be derived (§ 1257). If the Board is authorized to weigh
the values of competing beneficial uses, then logically it should
also be authorized to alter the historic rule of “first in time, first in
right” by imposing permit conditions which give a higher priority
to a more preferred beneficial use even though later in time.

Id. at 189.
226.

We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board's determination that
particular methods of use have become unreasonable by their
deleterious effects upon water quality.
Obviously, some
accommodation must be reached concerning the major public
interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources and
transport of adequate supplies for needs southward. The decision
is essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the
competing public interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified to
make in view of its special knowledge and expertise and its
combined statewide responsibility to allocate the rights to, and to
control the quality of, state water resources. (§ 174.) (26) (See
fn. 24.), (27) We conclude, finally, that the Board's power to
prevent unreasonable methods of use should be broadly interpreted to
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Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB (I)228 added water conservation
opportunities to the lexicon of reasonable, beneficial use considerations.
The SWRCB determined that IID's failure to develop a plan for additional
water conservation measures could constitute a misuse of water.229 The
SWRCB ordered IID to explore conservation opportunities and efficiency
improvements to be financed by urban junior priority holders in search of
new water.230 By 1988, the SWRCB (with judicial support) asserted that it
could impose a "physical solution" on IID and junior right holders if they
could not reach agreement on a conserved water transfer. Important to
the future Part 417 dispute, the SWRCB expressly recognized increased
water use efficiency as an important element of the reasonable, beneficial
use analysis.231
A more recent articulation of California's reasonable, beneficial use
doctrine occurred in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency.232 The plaintiff city
sought a guarantee of adequate groundwater within a basin that suffered
from an annual overdraft of water supply. The trial court determined that an
"equitable apportionment" between parties could be imposed as a physical
solution to the water supply issue to the detriment of senior water right
holders with priority. The California Supreme Court reversed the decision
and firmly protected senior water right holders. In so doing, the Court
bucked the beneficial use trend which disfavored agriculture by tilting water
resources towards larger population centers. Any proclivity the state may

enable the Board to strike the proper balance between the interests
in water quality and project activities in order to objectively
determine whether a reasonable method of use is manifested.
Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
227.

Here, the Board determined that changed circumstances
revealed in new information about the adverse effects of the
projects upon the Delta necessitated revised water quality
standards. Accordingly, the Board had the authority to modify the
projects' permits to curtail their use of water on the ground that the
projects' use and diversion of the water had become unreasonable.

Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
228. Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct.
App. 1986).
229. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Decision 1600, at 66 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. June 21, 1984).
230.

Id.

231. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WR 88-20, at 27-29 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. Sept. 7, 1988).
232.
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have revealed for "socializing" water for public uses in the wake of Audubon
was bluntly rebutted.233
As dynamic a concept as reasonable, beneficial use must be, the
California Supreme Court left little doubt that water allocation would not be
uprooted from its traditional respect for priority. The Court limited the
extent to which a lower priority reasonable and beneficial use of water can
preempt senior water rights.234
3. SWRCB Beneficial Use Enforcement Authority
a. SWRCB Authority
In California, a corollary question is implicated as to whether SWRCB's
exercise of its reasonable, beneficial use adjudicative authority conflicts with
or thwarts federal Colorado River law.
The SWRCB is the primary administrative agency making reasonable,
beneficial use determinations over California's developed surface water. The
SWRCB is authorized by the California legislature to "provide for the orderly
and efficient" appropriation of water rights and distribution of water
resources.235 Section 174 of the California Water Code grants the SWRCB
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts to "exercise the adjudicatory and
regulatory functions of the state in the field of water resources."236 As
prominently noted in the California decision, SWRCB authority is recognized

233.

Thus, although it is clear that a trial court may impose a
physical solution to achieve a practical allocation of water to
competing interests, the solution's general purpose cannot simply
ignore the priority rights of the parties asserting them. In ordering
a physical solution, therefore, a court may neither change
priorities among the water rights holders nor eliminate vested
rights in applying the solution without first considering them in
relation to the reasonable use doctrine.

Id. at 869 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
234.

Respondents unpersuasively argue for imposition of an
equitable physical solution that disregards prior legal water rights.
They cite the principle that the State Constitution requires the
greatest number of beneficial users that the water supply can
support, but they omit the requirement that this use be subject to
the rights of those with lawful priority to the water.

Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
235.

CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2008).

236. Id.; see also Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 231 Cal. Rptr.
283 (Ct. App. 1986).
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by the United States Supreme Court,237 while additional authorities, such as
United States v. SWRCB,238 have expressly239 and unequivocally240 established
that the SWRCB has significant authority to compel compliance with
reasonable, beneficial use.241

237.
238.
239.

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 647 (1978).
227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
All water rights, including appropriative, are subject to the
overriding constitutional limitation that water use must be
reasonable . . . . To that end, the Board is empowered to institute
necessary judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings to
prevent waste or unreasonable use . . . including imposition of new permit
terms . . . . Moreover, all permits of the projects are subject to the
continuing authority of the Board to prevent unreasonable use.

Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
240.

We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board's determination that
particular methods of use have become unreasonable by their
deleterious effects upon water quality.
Obviously, some
accommodation must be reached concerning the major public
interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources and
transport of adequate supplies for needs southward. The decision
is essentially a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the
competing public interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified to
make in view of its special knowledge and expertise and its
combined statewide responsibility to allocate the rights to, and to
control the quality of, state water resources. . . . We conclude,
finally, that the Board's power to prevent unreasonable methods of use
should be broadly interpreted to enable the Board to strike the
proper balance between the interests in water quality and project
activities in order to objectively determine whether a reasonable
method of use is manifested.

Id. at 188 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 174 (West 2008)) (emphasis added).
241.

[T]he Board has the separate and additional power to take
whatever steps are necessary to prevent unreasonable use or methods
of diversion . . . . That independent basis of authority vests
jurisdiction in the Board to compel compliance with the water
quality standards insofar as the projects' diversions and exports
adversely affect water quality.

Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
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b. IID Cases
The 1984 and 1988 SWRCB assessments of IID's reasonable, beneficial
use articulated criteria to evaluate IID's alleged waste: (1) other potential
beneficial uses for conserved water; (2) whether the excess water now serves
a reasonable and beneficial purpose; (3) probable benefits of water savings;
(4) amount of water reasonably required for current use; (5) amount and
reasonableness of the cost of saving water; (6) whether the required
methods of saving water are conventional and reasonable rather than
extraordinary; (7) a physical plan or solution.242 Additional factors that the
SWRCB is required to consider are the positive or negative environmental
impacts of the current use versus more efficient water use.243
The 1988 SWRCB order required IID to conserve of 100,000 AFY. The
SWRCB acknowledged the enormous financial burden this placed on IID and
made the 1988 order contingent upon IID finding a third party to pay for the
cost.244 The third party would become the beneficiary of the conserved water.
Otherwise, the SWRCB reserved to itself the right to impose a "physical
solution" requiring IID to conserve and requiring the recipient of the
conserved water to pay the costs, including environmental mitigation costs.
c. SWRCB Exclusive Jurisdiction over IID's Water Use
Since the 1980's, the SWRCB has reserved its rights to exercise
continuous, exclusive jurisdiction over IID. Despite this, in 2003, BuRec
utilized Part 417 to review whether IID's use was reasonable and beneficial.
It ignored both the SWRCB's jurisdiction and the State's request for
consultation on the matter.245
Assuming the propriety of Part 417 and compliance with section 8
conformity to state law, the State of California and the United States would
ordinarily exercise concurrent jurisdiction to determine IID's reasonable,
beneficial use of Colorado River water under state reasonable, beneficial use
standards. However, with the United States' acquiescence in 1986,
California first exercised and then retained jurisdiction to enforce that
obligation. Under these circumstances, the federal government is required
to defer to California. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the doctrine of prior

242. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Decision 1600, at 24-29 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. June 21, 1984).
243.

Id. at 25.

244. The availability of financial resources for implementing proposed water
conservation measures is a factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness
of an existing method of diversion and use. Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WR 88-20,
at 36 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 7, 1988).
245.

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 68.
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exclusive jurisdiction as a mandatory bar to federal jurisdiction when the
federal and state governments previously held concurrent jurisdiction over
water rights and the state tribunal exercised its jurisdiction first.246
California's prior exercise of jurisdiction automatically precludes BuRec from
separately adjudicating the matter.

246. In State Engineer v. South Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians,
339 F.3d 804, 813 (9th Cir. 2003), a Nevada state court entered a decree determining
water rights on the Humboldt River. A dispute arose and a case was filed in state
court that was removed to federal court. Id. The state and federal courts each
claimed jurisdiction over the matter and enjoined the other from conducting further
proceedings. Id. at 807-08. The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether a state
court that has adjudicated a water decree retains exclusive jurisdiction over its
administration, even though both the federal and state courts could have originally
exercised jurisdiction. Id. at 807. The Ninth Circuit explained that where "both
federal and state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction," each "may commence
proceedings to decide questions about the allocation of water rights." Id. at 813
(citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)).
However, "jurisdiction is only the power of the court to decide a matter." Id. (internal
quotation omitted). "The mere fact that state and federal courts are initially vested with
coequal authority does not mean that more than one court can actually adjudicate —
much less administer — decrees over the same res." Id. (emphasis in original).
...
The Federal and state courts exercise jurisdiction within the same
territory, derived from and controlled by separate and distinct
authority, and are therefore required, upon every principle of
justice and propriety, to respect the jurisdiction once acquired
over property by a court of the other sovereignty. If a court of
competent jurisdiction, Federal or state, has taken possession of
property, or by its procedure has obtained jurisdiction over the
same, such property is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
other authority as effectually as if the property had been entirely
removed to the territory of another sovereignty.
Id. at 809-810 (quoting Palmer v. Texas, 212 U.S. 118, 125 (1909)) (emphasis in original);
see also Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1922); United States v. Alpine
Land & Reservoir Co., 174 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he first court to gain
jurisdiction over a res exercises exclusive jurisdiction over an action involving that
res."). The doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction is "no mere discretionary
abstention rule," but "is a mandatory jurisdictional limitation," denying jurisdiction
to the federal courts. S. Fork Band, 339 F.3d at 810.
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d. SWRCB 2002 Water Transfer and Beneficial
Use Determination
By 2002, IID had voluntarily identified conservation opportunities and
a willing transferee who had agreed to negotiated payment terms. The
SWRCB reviewed this proposed long-term transfer of conserved water, IID's
full compliance with previous SWRCB reasonable, beneficial use mandates,
and the impacts of the proposed transfer on other water rights holders, the
environment, and other third parties.247
The SWRCB pressed for
environmental mitigation measures to dull the impact of the agricultural
water conservation and urban transfer on the Salton Sea and expressly
conditioned approval for the transfer on implementation of certain
mitigation.248 The SWRCB evaluated the broadest impact of its decision
and concluded:
To the extent that environmental impacts are not fully
mitigated, and to the extent that fallowing may result in
adverse socio-economic impacts, the public interest in the
transfer outweighs those adverse impacts. The transfer is a
critical part of California's efforts to reduce its use of the
Colorado River water in accordance with California's
Colorado River Water Use Plan, the Interim Surplus
Guidelines, and the draft QSA. Implementation of the

247.

Provided that IID implements the transfer in accordance with
the QSA and the flooding problem is resolved, we do not
anticipate the need, absent a change in circumstances, to
reassess the reasonableness of IID’s water use before 2024. IID’s
conservation and transfer of 230,000 to 300,000 afa will be in
furtherance of the SWRCB’s directive to IID, contained in
Decision 1600 and Order WR 88-20, to evaluate secure funding
for, and implement potential conservation measures. Because
irrigation efficiency is not the only fact relevant to a
determination of reasonableness, it would not be appropriate to
find, as requested by IID, that the circumstances under which we
anticipate it may be necessary to reassess IID’s water use are
limited to IID’s irrigation practices or technological advances in
irrigation efficiency.

Imperial Irrigation Dist., Revised Order WRO 2002-0013, at 81 (State Water
Res. Control Bd. Oct. 28, 2002).
248. "In conclusion, we find that, with the implementation of the SSHCS
[Salton Sea Habitat Conservation Strategy] for 15 years, the impacts of the
conservation and transfer project on the fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial
uses of the Salton Sea will not be unreasonable." Id. at 47.
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transfer as approved by this order will benefit not just the
parties to the transfer, but the state as a whole.249
In its determination, the SWRCB specifically identified and dismissed
the legal basis for any federal beneficial use preemption as a limit on its
own beneficial use determination.250
4. California Summary
California has a rich legal history supporting state sovereignty and
dominion over the determination of the reasonable, beneficial use of waters.
The legal precedents for reasonable, beneficial use were established in the
early days of the Gold Rush and continue to the present. These precedents
provide structure and predictability for all users of water within California.
The California judiciary has balanced pragmatic flexibility with respect
for priority through its reasonable, beneficial use determinations.
Reasonable, beneficial use is not a static definition under California law, but
one that evolves gradually. Over time, California courts, the California
legislature, and the SWRCB have deemed certain uses previously considered
beneficial as no longer beneficial, while recognizing new beneficial uses.
Notably, in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co.251 the U.S. Supreme Court
specifically referenced article X, section2 of the California Constitution and
unambiguously confirmed that it "constitutes California's basic water law, to
which the Federal Reclamation Act defers."252
As to the 2002 SWRCB review of IID's proposed transfer, California
exercised its right to control and direct the beneficial and most reasonable
uses of water within its borders and within the federal limit of 4.4 MAFY.
Relying on the Court's decision in California, the SWRCB had no reason to
believe it was without authority. There was no federal limitation involved,
such as the 160-acre limitation, or any inconsistency with a federal

249.
250.

Id. at 84.
As we stated previously, we question whether federal law can or
should be interpreted to preclude the use of water to mitigate the
impacts of conserving and transferring water for irrigation and
domestic purposes. But we need not resolve the issue here
because the federal beneficial use requirement cannot be
interpreted to limit IID’s ability to use Colorado River water to
mitigate impacts to the Salton Sea where IID is using its present
perfect rights in a manner consistent with state law.

Imperial Irrigation Dist., Order WRO 2002-0016, at 17 (Cal. State Water Res.
Control Bd. Dec. 20, 2002).
251.

United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).

252.

Id. at 751.
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preference for agricultural use.
The United States had previously
participated as a party in evidentiary hearings before the SWRCB, and since
then the SWRCB had retained continuing jurisdiction over IID's reasonable,
beneficial use and monitored IID water use compliance. SWRCB activity in
2002 was consistent with and an extension of SWRCB's exercised and
retained jurisdiction.
In 2002, neither the SWRCB adjudicatory process nor the substance of
the SWRCB reasonable beneficial use analysis was inconsistent with the
permanent allocation of the Colorado River created by the BCPA or the
Secretary's section 5 contract power. Similarly, California did nothing to
interfere with the Secretary's operation of the Colorado River infrastructure.
In sum, California's role regarding IID's reasonable, beneficial use does not
conflict with any federal purpose.
D. 43 C.F.R. Part 417 as Implied Federal Beneficial Use Authority
BuRec asserted, in the 2003 Imperial Irrigation District v. U.S. litigation,
that it had the exclusive beneficial use adjudicatory role pursuant to the
regulatory authority granted to it by Congress and recognized by the US
Supreme Court in Arizona v. California. It argued that the adoption of Part 417
was the proper exercise of its granted regulatory authority to exclusively
adjudicate IID reasonable, beneficial use under principles of federal law.
This section of the article examines and rejects this argument. An
examination of the Secretary's power to adopt regulations and the purpose
of such regulations, the wording and substantial adjudicatory procedural
deficiencies of Part 417, the historical application of Part 417 by BuRec, and
the inconsistency of Part 417 with the US 1932 contract with IID all reveal no
appropriate preemptory result.
1. Sources of Administrative Authority
The Reclamation Act requires the use of water to be beneficial and
limits water rights to such beneficial use: "The right to the use of water
acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right."253
BCPA section5 explicitly authorized the Secretary to adopt regulations
regarding contracts for the storage and delivery of water:
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, under
such general regulations as he may prescribe, to contract
for the storage of water in said reservoir and for the delivery

253.

43 U.S.C. § 372 (2008) (emphasis added).
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thereof at such points on the river and on said canal as may
be agreed upon, for irrigation and domestic uses . . . .254
The Reclamation Act, as incorporated into the BCPA, also authorizes
the Secretary to promulgate general rules and regulations:
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to
perform any and all acts and to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of this Act into full
force and effect.255
The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982256 (Reform Act) also authorizes the
Secretary to issue regulations related to federal reclamation law:
The Secretary may prescribe regulations and shall collect
all data necessary to carry out the provisions of this title
and other provisions of Federal reclamation law.”257
Thus, the Secretary is expressly authorized to adopt regulations
regarding the delivery of Colorado River water. But, Congressional
authorization for the Secretary to perform administrative adjudications
regarding a water right holder's reasonable beneficial use of Colorado River
water is not found in any statute. The adoption of federal reasonable,
beneficial use standards and a process to adjudicate compliance is a radical
departure from historical state, judicial, and contractual provisions and
cannot be implied from the statutory language granting the Secretary a
general power to adopt necessary regulations.
2. Early BuRec Regulations on the Colorado River
The first formal step towards the coupling of state and federal interests
on the Lower Colorado River is a letter258 from California contractors inviting
the Secretary to initiate enactment of the BCPA. Of particular relevance is
the inclusion of language stating, "[W]e do find that if there are no further
limitations then upon the construction of the Boulder Dam the supply will

254.

43 U.S.C. § 617d (2008).

255.

43 U.S.C. § 373 (2008).

256.

43 U.S.C. § 390aa-390zz-1 (2008).

257.

43 U.S.C. § 390ww(c) (2008).

258. Colorado River Commissioners of California, Preliminary Agreement
(February 21, 1930), in RAY LYMAN WILBUR & NORTHCUTT ELY, THE HOOVER DAM
DOCUMENTS app. 1001, at A475 (2d ed., GPO 1948).
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be ample . . . ." Based on the savings clause language in both the
Reclamation Act and the BCPA protecting the domain of state law and the
subsequent absence of a single express federal limitation, there can be no
implication that an extension of federal authority was underfoot.
The second step was the adoption of "General Regulations"259 which
incorporated key elements of the BCPA. Contracts for permanent service in
accord with section 4(a) are reaffirmed, as is the section 5 contracting
authority. In addition, "[t]he right is reserved to amend or extend these
regulations from time to time consistently with said compact and the laws of
Congress, as the public need may require."
The third major component in the evolution of regulation is a 1930
letter from the Secretary260 addressed to IID. A deferential tone emphasized
the "impossible" nature of dividing the Colorado until California submits a
definite figure quantifying the individual water rights within the 4.4 MAF
allocation.261 The Secretary recognized that "the division of California's share
of Colorado River water among various California interests is a matter which
the State, and not the Department of the Interior, should work out and
recommend to the Department." The Secretary provided a blank draft of what
later became the "Seven Party Agreement" (see infra), and acknowledged that
the state will have control over the final recommendation.
3. Incorporation of Seven-Party Agreement
The fifth important exchange between state and federal authorities is
the "Seven-Party Agreement."262 This document provided the formula for
apportionment and recognition of priority uses of the Colorado River by
California users until 2003. Seven entities in Southern California, both
agricultural and urban, addressed the California Division of Water Resources
and specifically requested that it "recognize said apportionments and
priorities in all matters relating to State authority and to recommend the
provisions of Article I . . . ."263

259. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CONTRACTS FOR THE STORAGE OF WATER IN BOULDER
CANYON RESERVOIR (1930), reprinted in THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, app.
1004, at A485.
260. Letter of the Secretary of the Interior Requesting Recommendation of the
State in Effecting a Water Allocation (November 5, 1930), in THE HOOVER DAM
DOCUMENTS, supra note 258, app. 1002, at A477.
261.

Id.

262. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist. et al., Agreement Requesting the Division of
Water Resources of the State of California (Seven-Party Water Agreement) (August
18, 1931), in THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, app. 1003, at A479.
263.

Id.
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Article I establishes an exact allocation between seven priorities of
use. MWD received a fourth and fifth priority, each of 550,000 AFY,264 while
San Diego gained an equal right in the fifth priority to its own 112,000 AFY.265
Just as importantly, the standard of beneficial, consumptive use was
identified as the measure of each right, which for lack of any express
reference or definition, remains to be construed as established by
California law.266
California law was explicitly imported into and borrowed for federal
authority. Article I of the Seven-Party Agreement was adopted wholesale
into the federal regulations,267 which were governed by provisions of both
the 1902 Act and the BCPA. The federal regulation adopting the Seven-Party
Agreement provided the capstone of section 8 beneficial use limitations.
Cooperative federalism functioned without hitch.
4. 1932 Contract
The sixth major exchange in the administrative record is the water
delivery contract between IID and the Secretary.268 The alternating back-andforth of state-federal cooperation established a pattern of deference and
respect from both sides. California contractors submitted the Seven-Party
Agreement to their own state authority — the Division of Water Resources —
which formally recommended that the Secretary adopt the intrastate
allocation of water rights into federal regulations. The Secretary obliged and
utilized the regulations in the Colorado River apportionment contracts with
each of the individual contractors. At the outset, it did not appear that
California had yielded any degree of state authority to control the use of
Colorado River water within California.
The contracts established a clear role for the Secretary as the operator
of the infrastructure system in accord with the language of the BCPA. Article
2 of the 1932 Contract authorized the Secretary to "construct, operate, and
maintain a dam and incidental works,"269 while article 5 of the 1931 Contract
referenced the applicability of reclamation law and outlined the basic
arrangement whereby revenues were to be collected by the Secretary to pay
for "all expenses of construction, operation, and maintenance of the said

264.

Id. at A480.

265.

Id.

266.

Id. at A480-81.

267.

U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 259.

268. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Contract for Construction of Diversion Dam,
Main Canal, and Appurtenant Structures and for Delivery of Water (December 1,
1932), in THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, supra note 256, app. 1106, at A595.
269.
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diversion dam, main canal, and appurtenant structures."270 Article 8 of the
1932 Contract governed the terms for transition of certain components of
the conveyance system and the inheritance of costs.271
In addition, Article 17 imported the Seven-Party Agreement and made
an express allocation of each portion of California's 4.4 MAFY, again "in the
amounts and with priorities in accordance with the recommendation of the
Chief of the Division of Water Resources of the State of California." 272
Article 24 of the 1932 Contract contained an express reservation to
the right to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations not
inconsistent with this contract, governing the diversion and
delivery of water hereunder to the district and to other
contractors. Such rules and regulations may be modified,
revised, and/or extended from time to time after notice to
the district and opportunity for it to be heard, as may be
deemed proper, necessary or desirable by the Secretary to
carry out the true intent and meaning of the law and this
contract, or amendments thereof, or to protect the interests
of the United States. The district hereby agrees that in the
operation and maintenance of the Imperial Dam and AllAmerican Canal, all such rules and regulations will be fully
adhered to.273
Article 27 of the 1932 Contract referenced the agreement of the IID
and the Secretary to resolve disputes or disagreements by arbitration or
court proceedings.274
Article 30 of the 1932 Contract summarized that reclamation law
governs "the construction, operation, and maintenance of the works to be
constructed hereunder" other than as provided by the BCPA.275
The 1932 Contract governed IID's operations on the California side of
the Lower Colorado for nearly seventy years with only minor modifications.
Article 24 of the contract comprises IID's most substantial contractual grant
of authority to BuRec recognizing that the Secretary has reserved authority
to create rules and regulations for diversion and delivery.276 But this
language does not provide the Secretary with authority contrary to the 1932

270.

Palo Verde Irrigation Dist. et. al, supra note 262.

271.

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 268.

272.

Id.

273.

Id.

274.

Id.

275.

Id.

276.

Id.
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Contract, such as to reallocate IID's permanent water right or to adjudicate
reasonable, beneficial use determinations contrary to the requirements of
section 8 of the Reclamation Act. Without having to second-guess whether
it had accidentally given away the "keys to the kingdom" in the event of a
contract dispute, Article 27 expressly secured for IID the ability to decode
the "true intent and meaning of the law and this contract" through an
independent third party.
5. 43 C.F.R. Part 417
a. Federal Register Notices
In 1969, the Secretary opportunistically filled the partial vacuum of
diminished state authority created in the wake of the Arizona decision. The
Secretary issued a seemingly innocuous notice in the Federal Register
promulgating "new" procedures for Colorado River water delivery under
contracts.277 These new procedures related to conservation practices in the
"diversion, delivery, distribution, and use of the Colorado River" so that
deliveries not "exceed that reasonably required for beneficial use."278 The
Secretary's notice cited the BCPA, the contracts for the storage and delivery
of Colorado River water made pursuant to the BCPA, and the Decree of the
Supreme Court in Arizona as the enabling authorities for proposed Part
417.279 In 1972, the Secretary posted an intermediate revision280 which,
again, cited the BCPA, the contracts and the Decree enabling authorities.
Notably, none of the enabling sources contain an express
authorization by Congress to the Secretary to act as a reasonable, beneficial
use adjudicator.
These sources only authorized the Secretary to
promulgate rules and regulations regarding entering permanent contracts
for the delivery of Colorado River water. Furthermore, these same
authorities nowhere suggest that the Secretary could administratively
adjudicate reasonable, beneficial use disputes with contractors or
supplant the contractual provisions requiring arbitration or judicial
resolution of any disputes.

277. Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water
Conservation Measures, 34 Fed. Reg. 11499 (proposed July 11, 1969) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 417).
278.

Id.

279.

Id.

280. Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water
Conservation Measures, 37 Fed. Reg. 18076 (proposed Sept. 7, 1972) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 417).
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b. Part 417 Textual Analysis
The Part 417.2 regulation language expressly ties water deliveries by
the Secretary to a limit "reasonably required for beneficial use."281
Part 417.3 then enunciates the first and only federal language that
details the components of a "federal beneficial use":
Following consultation with each Contractor and after
consideration of all relevant comments and suggestions
advanced by the Contractors in such consultations, the
Regional Director will formulate his recommendations and
determinations relating to the matters specified in §417.2.
The recommendations and determinations shall, with
respect to each Contractor, be based upon but not
necessarily limited to such factors as the area to be
irrigated, climatic conditions, location, land classifications,
the kinds of crops raised, cropping practices, the type of
irrigation system in use, the condition of water carriage and
distribution facilities, record of water orders, and rejections
of ordered water, general operating practices, the operating
efficiencies and methods of irrigation of the water users,
amount and rate of return flows to the river, municipal water
requirements and the pertinent provisions of the Contractor's Boulder
Canyon Project Act water delivery contract."282
Part 417 applies to all valid contracts for the delivery of Colorado River
water in the Lower Basin. However, it does not apply to Indian uses (federal

281.

The Regional Director or his representative will, prior to the
beginning of each calendar year, arrange for and conduct such
consultations with each Contractor as the Regional Director may
deem appropriate as to the making by the Regional Director of
annual recommendations relating to water conservation measures
and operating practices in the diversion, delivery, distribution and
use of Colorado River water, and to the making by the Regional
Director of annual determinations of each Contractor's estimated
water requirements for the ensuing calendar year to the end that
deliveries of Colorado River water to each Contractor will not
exceed those reasonably required for beneficial use under the respective
Boulder Canyon Project Act contract or other authorization for use
of Colorado River water.

43 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2007).
282.

Id. § 417.3 (emphasis added).
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reserved rights)283 and the BuRec Director has express discretion to exclude
municipal and industrial contractors from Part 417 review.284 In other words,
Part 417 is primarily applicable to agricultural contractors. Furthermore, it is
worded as a "look ahead" prediction for the determination of allowed
deliveries for the subsequent year.
Under Part 417, delivery shall not exceed an amount "reasonably
required for beneficial use."285 The standard for predicting each contractor's
annual water delivery requirement is a nonexclusive standard loosely based
on a variety of factors, including the "pertinent provisions" of the
contractor's water delivery contract. 286
In addition, Part 417 imparts no standing or participation by any other
impacted right holder, nor does it provide for administrative adjudication
due process procedures. Contractors can only appeal BuRec Regional
Director decisions to the Secretary, but the Secretary's decision is final
without any neutral hearing. Part 417 is an unconstitutional form of
administrative adjudication.
c. Part 417 Is Missing Essential Due
Process Protections
"Formal" and "informal" adjudications are not legal principles as such,
but are terms of art to describe the application (or non-application) of
certain aspects of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).287 "Formal"
adjudication refers to those proceedings governed by § 554 of the APA. That
section applies to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."288 It
applies when a statute or agency regulation requires a hearing pursuant to
§ 554. Section 554 contains numerous procedural requirements for any
"formal" agency hearing.
All other adjudications are governed by § 555 of the APA. Therefore,
all agency adjudications are "informal" unless otherwise required by
statute.289 Part 417 is an informal adjudication. No applicable statute or

283.

Id. § 417.1.

284.

Id.

285.

Id. § 417.2.

286.

Id. § 417.3.

287. Administrative Procedures Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, and in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
288.

5 U.S.C. § 554 (2008).

289. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 n.37 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (informal adjudication is a "residual category including all agency actions that
are not rulemaking and need not be conducted through on the record hearings").
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regulation requires application of § 554 of the APA to Secretarial
determinations of beneficial use of Colorado River water, therefore § 555 of
the APA governs.
Informal adjudication under § 555 of the APA requires an agency to
provide basic procedural safeguards. The agency must:
(a) allow any party appearing before it to be represented by an
attorney or other representative;
(b) permit the claimant to receive copies of any evidence submitted
against him;
(c) issue subpoenas on request; and
(d) provide prompt notice of the grounds of any denial of requested
relief.290
The requirement of due process exists above and beyond the
requirements of the APA. Satisfaction of the procedural requirements of the
APA may still result in a court determination that the procedural compliance
is inadequate to meet due process requirements.291
The seminal test for whether an agency violated due process
procedural requirements is found in Mathews v. Eldridge:292
Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances. . . . Our prior decisions indicate that
identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.293
The due process test as articulated in Mathews applies independently of
the APA. If the agency's adjudication procedures fall short of what is
required for due process, the agency's action is invalid. The APA allows, in

290.

5 U.S.C. § 555.

291. See, e.g., Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1994);
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.1 (4th ed. 2002).
292.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).

293.

Id. at 335.
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§ 706(2)(B) and (D), a reviewing court to set aside agency action if it is
"contrary to constitutional light" or "without observance of procedure required
by law," including applicable constitutional due process requirements.294
The Ninth Circuit addressed due process issues in a line of cases
regarding Interior recognition of the Samish Indian tribe.295 In Greene v. Lujan,
the Department of the Interior determined by informal adjudication that the
Samish were not a recognized tribe.296 The tribe challenged the conclusion,
claiming procedures used to determine their tribal status did not afford
them a hearing or an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and violated
their due process rights under the Mathews balancing test.297 The district
court ordered a full hearing with appropriate APA formal adjudication
safeguards.298 Interior appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the
informal adjudication procedures used by Interior violated due process.299
The Greene v. Lujan opinion began by summarizing the procedural
inadequacies outlined by the district court, including: 1) the inability to
call witnesses; 2) no argument permitted before the decision was made; 3)
denied access to all material evidence; and 4) lack of impartiality,
including ex parte contacts and other indications that the issue may have
been prejudged.300
The Ninth Circuit then explained, "due process generally includes an
opportunity for some type of hearing before the deprivation of a property
interest, and . . . in almost every setting where important decisions turn on
questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses."301 The Court described the importance of
rights being litigated in such a case stating, "[i]nformal decision-making,
behind closed doors and with an undisclosed record, is not an appropriate
determination of matters of such gravity."302
Part 417 as written, and as utilized by the Secretary violates due
process standards. As such, Part 417 should not be construed as a

294. See, e.g., Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278, 1285 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("Even
if there is 'substantial evidence' in the record for an agency finding, the court must
set the finding aside if the agency failed to follow the 'procedures required by law' in
making its determination.").
295. Greene v. Lujan, 1992 WL 533059 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1266 (9th
Cir. 1995).
296.

Id. at 1.

297.

Id.

298.

Id. at 8-9.

299.

Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1995).

300.

Id. at 1274.

301.

Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970)).

302.

Id. at 1275.
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regulation intended to authorize the BuRec or the Secretary to conduct
reasonable, beneficial use adjudications because such adjudications affect
important property interests.
d. Historical Application of Part 417
Yet, prior to 2003, there was neither a single exercise of Part 417
authority to find waste nor a correlating suit by a contractor challenging
either the authority or application of the regulation. In this time, BuRec
approved all orders without a substitution of its own judgment or acting as
an administrative tribunal. Occasionally, contractors voluntarily complied
with BuRec requests for resubmittal of modified water orders.
e. 2003 Application of Part 417 to IID
In 2003, BuRec made its first Part 417 adjudication. Peculiarly, the
initial BuRec determination to refuse IID's requested water delivery
preceded the actual Part 417 review. Then, the formal Part 417 review was
focused and restricted to a single agricultural contractor, IID, rather than to
the entire class of agricultural contractors. Native American and municipal
users were also excluded from the scope of the review. The Regional
Director evaluated each of the listed Part 417.3 factors, but narrowly
evaluated only such factors against the 2003 IID request for water, and
unilaterally denied the IID order and imposed a water delivery reduction.
The July 2003, BuRec Part 417 beneficial use determination did not
acknowledge or recognize the 2002 SWRCB determination that the transfer
of conserved water was a reasonable and beneficial use of water under state
law. 303 Instead, BuRec ignored previously identified state evaluations of
conservation, environmental impacts, and socio-economic factors in the
reasonable, beneficial use analysis and narrowly determined that IID was
inefficiently applying waters to its acreage and was wasting water in
violation of the reasonable, beneficial use provision of its federal contract.
In sum, IID was denied the benefit of its senior water rights under the
priority provisions of both the 1931 Seven-Party Agreement and IID's
subsequent 1932 water delivery contract. By finding IID wasted water in
violation of its federal contract, BuRec caused IID to forfeit part of its
senior water right, which cascaded free of charge to the next junior water
rights holders, CVWD and MWD. As a result, the proposed stateauthorized transfer of IID water to CVWD and SDCWA in exchange for

303. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 70; see also U.S. BUREAU
RECLAMATION, supra note 68.

OF
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payments to fund conservation and environmental mitigation was
thwarted by federal intervention.304
The Regional Director selectively identified Articles 17, 24, and 30 of
the 1932 IID water contract as "pertinent provisions," to the exclusion of all
other articles also within the contract. Most notably, the Regional Director
ignored Article 27 for resolution of disputes or disagreements by "arbitration
or court proceedings." As applied, the "true intent and meaning" of both the
law and the contract were administratively commandeered through a unique
Part 417 process that violated IID's due process protections.
There was no opportunity for a hearing, no ability to call or crossexamine witnesses, no discovery rights, no opportunity to argue before a
hearing, and no right to have the dispute resolved by a neutral third party.
The Secretary used Part 417 to unilaterally diminish IID's water right without
compensation; a suspect action that raises fundamental takings issues.305
Part 417 does not include a guarantee of due process, provide a role for
state participation or deference to state decisions.
6. Limits on the Secretary's Regulatory Beneficial
Use Authority
Regulations promulgated by a federal administrative agency must not
fall outside the authority conferred by Congress. They must be rooted
within a Congressional grant of power, conform to Congressional procedural
requirements, and reasonably be within the contemplation of the
authorizing statute.
Regulations must also be consistent with congressional purpose.306 In
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown307 the Supreme Court stated:
The legislative power of the United States is vested in the
Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by
governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a

304. Coincidentally, the amount of water gained by MWD through this federal
review was approximately the same exact amount MWD was in jeopardy of losing as
a result of California’s reduction of Colorado River water in excess of 4.4 MAF.
305. The full development of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article. See
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); Klamath
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United
States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007).
306. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-08 (1979); United States v.
Quincy-Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 649 F. Supp. 487, 490 (E.D. Wash. 1986); Zarr v.
Barlow, 800 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986); Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. United States,
559 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1977).
307.
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grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which
that body imposes.308
In addition, the regulations must have some nexus to the
legislative authority.309 To determine whether a nexus exists, the
Supreme Court has held that regulations must be reasonably within the
contemplation of the statute:
The pertinent inquiry is whether under any of the arguable
statutory grants of authority the OFCCP [Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs] disclosure regulations
relied on by the respondents are reasonably within the
contemplation of that grant of authority.310
The nexus requirement is satisfied only when the grant of authority
contemplates the regulations issued. "What is important is that the
reviewing court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority
contemplates the regulations issued."311
a. Ickes v. Fox
Ickes v. Fox312 and Fox v. Ickes313 both address the role of the Secretary in
beneficial use decisions. In 1906, the Sunnyside Water Users Association
(the Association) entered into a contract with the United States regarding
the reclamation of the waters of the Yakima River.314 Pursuant to this
contract, the Association agreed that the aggregate amount of their water
rights "should not exceed the number of acres of land capable of
irrigation by the total quantity of water available."315 The parties also
agreed that the Secretary should determine the number of acres capable
of such irrigation, "'to be based upon and measured and limited by the
beneficial use of water.'"316
After execution of the contract, the Association applied for water rights
for the irrigation of the lands involved. By the terms of the applications, the

308.

Id. at 302 (emphasis added).

309.

Id. at 304.

310.

Id. at 305.

311.

Id. at 308 (emphasis added).

312.

300 U.S. 82 (1937).

313.

137 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

314.

Ickes, 300 U.S. at 88-89.

315.

Id. at 89.

316.

Id.
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measure of the water right for the land "was stated to be that quantity which
shall be beneficially used for the irrigation thereof, not exceeding the share
proportionate to irrigable acreage of the water supply actually
available. . . ."317
The Supreme Court recognized that, pursuant to the Reclamation Act
and the Association's contract with the Secretary, the Secretary had been
making factual determinations regarding the association's beneficial use
of water:
[T]hereafter the successive Secretaries of the Interior
uniformly construed the Reclamation Act and the
contractual obligations, to the effect that the owners of the lands
had purchased a sufficient quantity of water to beneficially and
successfully irrigate their lands, to be determined by representatives of
the Secretary having physical charge of the water distribution,
from a factual investigation and personal examination of the lands and
the crops growing thereon and the water requirements thereof.
...
Pursuant thereto, it was determined by representatives of
the successive Secretaries that 4.84 acre-feet of water per
annum was necessary to beneficially and successfully
irrigate respondents' lands . . . .318
In response to a water shortage in 1930, the Secretary proposed the
construction of a new reservoir to supply water to the project.319 The
Secretary notified the water users that they would be deprived of all water in
excess of three acre-feet unless they made applications for additional water
at new rates. The water users refused320 and sued the Secretary. The
Supreme Court noted that the Secretary's new three acre-foot limit was a
digression from the Secretary's historical 4.84 AF determinations, which
were based upon the users' historical beneficial use of water:
Under the Reclamation Act, . . . as well as under the law of
Washington, "beneficial use" was "the basis, the measure
and the limit of the right." And by the express terms of the
contract made between the government and the Water
Users Association in behalf of respondents and other
shareholders, the determination of the Secretary as to the number of
acres capable of irrigation was "to be based upon and measured and

317.

Id. at 90.

318.

Id. at 91 (emphasis added).

319.

Id. at 92; Fox, 137 F.2d at 31.

320.

Ickes, 300 U.S. at 92-93; Fox, 137 F.2d at 31.
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limited by the beneficial use of water." Predecessors of petitioner,
accordingly, had decided that 4.84 acre-feet of water per
annum per acre was necessary to the beneficial and
successful irrigation of respondents' lands; and upon that
decision, for a period of more than twenty years prior to the
wrongs complained of, there was delivered to and used
upon the lands that quantity of water.321
After the Supreme Court determined the United States was not an
indispensable party,322 the suit went back to the district court. The district
court found that the Secretary's new charges for water in excess of three acrefeet were proper; however, the appellate court, in Fox v. Ickes, reversed because
the landowners' rights were based not on contract but on beneficial use:
In holding that appellants' rights were dependent on the
enforcement of contracts with the United States, we think
the trial court failed to follow the decision in Ickes v. Fox,
decided by the Supreme Court in a previous appeal in these
proceedings. . . . the Supreme Court held that the rights of
applicants were not limited to the enforcement of any
contract with the government. The opinion said: "Under
the Reclamation Act, . . . as well as under the law of
Washington, 'beneficial use' was 'the basis, the measure, and the
limit of the right.'
. . . Appropriation was made not for the use of the
government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of
the landowners . . . .
....
Reading the Reclamation Act in the light of the decision in
Ickes v. Fox, we find the situation in this case to be as
follows: The water-rights of appellants are not determined by contract
but by beneficial use.323
Most importantly, the Court explained that even in the case where the
Secretary was expressly given certain beneficial use authority by contract
(unlike on the Colorado River), the Secretary's beneficial use evaluations
were afforded "tentative" status, and the trial court was the ultimate
decision-maker as to beneficial use as defined by state law:

321.

Ickes, 300 U.S. at 94 (emphasis added).

322.

Id. at 96.

323.

Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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The amount of water to which appellants are entitled by
reason of prior appropriations for beneficial use can only be
finally determined by a court of the State of Washington. However,
when the Secretary decides that there is surplus water
available which can be delivered to appellants without
violating the rights of others, he must make a tentative
determination of appellants' rights.324
Ultimately, the Supreme Court refused to allow the Secretary to
implement the new charges.325
b. Central Arizona Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Lujan
In Central Arizona Irrigation & Drainage District v. Lujan,326 a federal district
court cleanly distinguished the Secretary's ability to allocate Colorado River
water and the aspect of Colorado River water use controlled by state law:
The allocation and preferences given to CAP [Central
Arizona Project] water seems to be within the exclusive
province of the Secretary of the Interior; once the
preferences are already established, the possible uses of that
water are governed by state law. Consequently, the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized to allocate CAP water to M & I
users. Then M & I users may use their water for any use
authorized by Arizona law, including recharge.327
7. Conclusion: Part 417 as Implied Federal Authority
In the 2003 IID v. U.S. litigation, the Secretary relied on section 5 of the
BCPA authority for federal beneficial use preemption. Part 417 may not
exceed the authority authorized by the BCPA or contract. Congress did not
expressly grant the Secretary the power to adjudicate reasonable beneficial
use or venture into California for purposes of reallocating water
appropriations or distributions among California users. After California,
Arizona cannot credibly support any implied Part 417 usurpation of the
traditional state domain of intrastate reasonable beneficial use.
While the discretionary authority of the Secretary was left open by the
Arizona Court in times of shortage, no such powers exist under either surplus

Id. at 36 (emphasis added).

325.

Id. at 35-36.

326.

764 F. Supp. 582 (D. Az. 1991).

327.

Id. at 591.
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or normal conditions.328 While certain aspects of California's sluggish
response to over a decade of federal efforts to limit California's total
aggregate use may deserve critique, the fact of the matter is that
the Secretary declared 2003 a normal year on the Colorado River. The
only authorized option available to the Secretary was to cap California
at 4.4 MAF.
New Mexico affirmed the presumption of state sovereignty and
unambiguously enunciated a judicial reluctance to expand implied federal
authorities to new purposes beyond those expressed in the particular
enabling act. Part 417 does not align with the strict purposes of the BCPA if
used as a substitute for state definition and procedure. Accordingly, any
extension of implied authority must comply with state beneficial, reasonable
use law.
At a minimum, the judiciary is left to determine disputes involving
beneficial use, not the Secretary. Even in a case such as Ickes, where the
Secretary was granted a beneficial use role by express contractual provisions,
the Secretary's decisions were merely tentative and not binding on a court.
Part 417 lacks any statutory or judicial underpinning if utilized to usurp the
proper deference accorded to state reasonable, beneficial use law and the
resolution of reasonable, beneficial use disputes by the judiciary.
Other states have also supported state sovereignty in making
beneficial, reasonable use determinations of Colorado River water. For
example, both in the litigation surrounding Arizona v. California, and in the
recent dispute over California's use of Arizona's Colorado River entitlement,
Arizona never argued for federal usurpation of California's determination of
beneficial, reasonable use. The proper reach of the Arizona holding should
be read to support the narrow purpose of the BCPA: to achieve a 4.4 MAFY
cap on California's consumption and to funnel all interstate allocations of
Colorado River water through formal section 5 contracts. Arizona would
agree with this conclusion.
Some suggest that the federal use of Part 417 was a pragmatic and
necessary political prod to move California agencies towards QSA execution.
Others claim that California should not be read to limit the BCPA or Arizona.

328.

Arizona carefully staked out an additional yard of turf for the
Secretary in times of “shortage”, which is one of three formal
standard choices the Secretary can make each year through his or
her Annual Operating Plan while determining the status of water
supply in the entire Colorado system. For purposes of this
analysis, it will be noted that the Secretary noted that 2003 was
not a “surplus” or “shortage” year, but rather a “normal” year, thus
muting the relevance of this authority in times of drought. 373
U.S. at 594.
1571

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

So long as the BCPA is controlled by the Reclamation Act, Arizona cannot
escape the full impact of California.
In the event of a reasonable, beneficial use dispute, the SWRCB and
each of the Colorado River right holders within California had available
procedural avenues to enforce the reasonable, beneficial use obligations of
each right holder. Any California intrastate dispute about how to divide the
4.4 MAFY from the Colorado in a normal year was controlled by existing
water right priorities, subject to California reasonable, beneficial use laws;
federal intrusion was not required, and no federal purpose was served. The
use of Part 417 must therefore be considered an invalid extension of implied
federal authority not supported by law.
E. Federal Preemption Conclusion
We are mindful, in deciding whether later federal law overrides
inconsistent state law, that we may not seek out conflicts between state
and federal regulation where none clearly exists.329
There is neither express nor clearly implied congressional intent to
support the federal allegation that Part 417 preempts California's beneficial
use sovereignty. The federal government carries the burden of proof when
attempting to wrest reasonable, beneficial use jurisdiction from the states.
When evaluated against Congressional authorities and the express language
of section 8 of the Reclamation Act, there is no express or implied authority
granting the Secretary discretion to intrude on the jurisdiction of California
recognized and protected so forcefully in California.
Federal utilization of Part 417 to administratively adjudicate intrastate
reasonable, beneficial use and usurp the authority of the SWRCB is the
same issue addressed in California. The federal position in the IID v. U.S.
litigation argued that Part 417 preempted any California reasonable,
beneficial use determinations and left no role for California. This position is
directly contravened by California. Again, California holds that "a state
limitation or condition on the federal management or control of a federally
financed water project is valid unless it clashes with express or clearly
implied congressional intent or works at cross-purposes with an important
federal interest served by the congressional scheme."330 California and New
Mexico lend a sobering perspective to the full scope of federal water
authority. Judicial opinions and the Law of the River must be interpreted for
their clear and plain meaning. No source authorizes the Secretary to wander
into the realm of intrastate reasonable, beneficial use adjudications in
usurpation of state adjudicatory bodies. Section 5 BCPA contract authority

United States v. California, 694 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 1982).

330.

Id. at 1177.
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raises no express or implied conflicts to support the Secretary's usurpation
of state reasonable, beneficial use authority.
There is no instance of California legislative, judicial, or administrative
authority that conflicts with federal purposes in the realm of reasonable,
beneficial use. California reasonable, beneficial use regulation,331 which has
a much broader scope332 than Part 417, broadly defines domestic,333
municipal,334 and irrigation335 uses, but it is nonetheless consistent with
federal purposes. While consistency can be partially attributed to the
shallow sources of federal authority regarding reasonable, beneficial use
meaning or enforcement, the federal silence is also evidence of deference to
the long-standing supremacy of state water law reinforced by California. With
its fertile agricultural lands and high productivity, California has often

331. "Beneficial Use of Water: Beneficial use of water includes those uses
defined in this subarticle. The board will determine whether other uses of water are
beneficial when considering individual applications to appropriate water." CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 23, § 659 (2008).
332. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 660 (2008) (Domestic Uses); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
23, § 661 (2008) (Irrigation Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 662 (2008) (Power Use);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 662.5 (2008) (Frost Protection Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23,
§ 663 (2008) (Municipal Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 664 (2008) (Mining Use); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 665 (2008) (Industrial Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 666 (2008)
(Fish and Wildlife Preservation and Enhancement Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 667
(2008) (Aquaculture Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 667.5 (2008) (Fish and Wildlife
Protection and Enhancement); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 668 (2008) (Recreational
Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 668.5 (2008) (Water Quality Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
23, § 669 (2008) (Stockwatering Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 669.5 (2008) (Name
and Address of Applicant); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 670 (2008) (Water Quality Use);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 670.5 (2008) (Supplement to Application May Be Required);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 670.6 (2008) (Instream Beneficial Use Assessment); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 671 (2008) (Frost Protection Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 672
(2008) (Heat Control Use); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 673 (2008) (General
Requirements); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 23, § 674 (2008) (Requirements).
333. Domestic use means the use of water in homes, resorts, motels,
organization camps, camp grounds, etc., including the incidental watering of
domestic stock for family sustenance or enjoyment and the irrigation of not to
exceed one-half acre in lawn, ornamental shrubbery, or gardens at any single
establishments. The use of water at a camp ground or resort for human
consumption, cooking or sanitary purposes is a domestic use.
334. Municipal use means the use of water for the municipal water supply of a
city, town, or other similar population group, and use incidental thereto for any
beneficial purpose.
335. Irrigation use includes any application of water to the production of
irrigated crops or the maintenance of large areas of lawns, shrubbery, or gardens.
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pioneered the development of reasonable, beneficial use law. It must be left
with no less than the full rights reserved to and accorded all states by the
Constitution in the federal system. Without a conflict, federal law cannot
preempt state law.
Since California, federal courts have reestablished state supremacy over
beneficial use determinations. In United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.336
the Secretary sought to modify the Nevada State Engineer's determination
awarding local irrigators an amount of water historically applied towards
growing alfalfa so that the difference in flow could be applied as a federally
reserved water right to forest lands much like that in U.S. v. New Mexico. The
Secretary argued that the beneficial standard of usefulness for irrigated
water should be in proportion to a fixed yield, which would allow excess
water to be diverted as water use efficiency increased.
The court concluded that the federal projections of an enhanced water
yield were made under optimized conditions, which would not be actualized
and that the farmers' use of the water and the techniques for growing alfalfa
were reasonable. Ultimately, the court decided that "the conspicuous
absence of transfer procedures, taken in conjunction with the clear general
deference to state water law, impels the conclusion that Congress intended
transfers to be subject to state water law.'"337 Furthermore, the Court
announced "beneficial use itself was intended by Congress to be governed
by state law,"338 and that "[w]hile there were provisions of federal law which
were intended to displace state law, such as the 160-acre limit . . . beneficial
use itself was intended to be governed by state law."339
The court further acknowledged the differences in water law between
western states, yet found two general rules of beneficial use common to all.
Waste does not accommodate "unreasonable transmission loss and use of
cost-ineffective methods," while unreasonableness requires evaluation of
"alternative uses of the water."340 The Court summarized state beneficial use
law as a "dynamic concept," evolving through time as conditions change.341
Alpine has important bearing on IID v. U.S. in two vital respects. First,
is the similar nature of the government calculus used to determine that a
portion of agricultural water is not yielding maximum efficiency, despite the
fact that the water is being reasonably used. The Alpine court deflected the
federal attempt to pry water away from an established reasonable and
beneficial use. Per the SWRCB determination, IID's transfer of conserved

336.

697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983).

337.

Id. at 858.

338.

Id. at 854.

339. Id. (citing 35 CONG. REC. 6677 (1907) (statement of Rep. Mondell); 35 CONG.
REC. 2222 (1907) (statement of Sen. Clark); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)).
340.

697 F.2d at 854.

341.

Id. at 855.
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water was both beneficial and reasonable. While Part 417 makes no
determination that directly confronts the reasonableness of the water
transfer, it identifies the inefficiency of applied water. Like Alpine, Part 417
utilizing idealized water efficiency models lacks federal transfer procedures
and also lacks federal analysis or procedures related to the assessment of
reasonableness in connection with a proposed voluntary water transfer.
State law should be afforded full berth to effectuate its own beneficial use
determinations related to water transfers.
Second, is the disposition of the court in regard to the authority of the
Nevada State Engineer. The court imported the relatively newly minted rule
from California and declared "[f]undamental principles of federalism require
the national government to consult state processes and weigh state
substantive law in shaping and defining a federal water policy."342 Within the
IID litigation, there is little evidence of BuRec's effort to consider state policy.
Nevada v. United States343 provides additional authority that limits an
extension of federal control over state beneficial use determinations. The
Nevada Court considered the general nature of federal intrusion upon state
water rights and concluded, "[w]e are bound to say that the Government's
position, if accepted, would do away with half a century of decided case law
relating to the Reclamation Act of 1902 and water rights in the public
domain of the West."344 In a scolding tone the court added:
In the light of these cases, we conclude that the
Government is completely mistaken if it believes that the
water rights confirmed to it by the Orr Ditch decree in 1944
for use in irrigating lands within the Newlands Reclamation
Project were like so many bushels of wheat, to be bartered,
sold, or shifted about as the Government might see fit.
Once these lands were acquired by settlers in the Project, the
Government's "ownership" of the water rights was at most
nominal; the beneficial interest in the rights confirmed to the
Government resided in the owners of the land within the
Project to which these water rights became appurtenant
upon the application of Project water to the land. As in Ickes
v. Fox and Nebraska v. Wyoming, the law of relevant State and
the contracts entered into by the landowners and the United
States make this point very clear.345

342.

Id.

343.

463 U.S. 110 (1983).

344.

Id. at 121.

345.

Id. at 126.
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Any legal interpretation giving the Secretary authority to disregard
state dominion over reasonable, beneficial use must be met with skepticism.
Part 417 has no basis in Congressional authority to overrule state
reasonable, beneficial use sovereignty.
III.

Federal Violation of the 1932 Water Delivery Contract

A separate and independent legal flaw in addition to the erroneous
claim of federal preemption by Part 417 is the direct violation of the
provisions of the 1932 United States contract with IID.
A. BuRec Authority to Contract
As noted above, section5 of the BCPA authorized the Secretary to enter
permanent contracts for delivery of Colorado River water. Early Regulations
and the creation of the Seven-Party Agreement culminated in the 1932
contract346 between IID and the United States.
B. 1932 Water Delivery Contract
Under the contract, IID is required to put its water to reasonable,
beneficial use. Article 17 states, "said water shall be delivered as ordered
by the District, and as reasonably required for potable and irrigation
purposes . . .." The Contract does not define what "reasonably required"
means. IID asserted that its 2002 uses and its 2003 water order were in
amounts reasonably required, while BuRec flatly asserted the contrary.
Thus, a dispute arose as to the interpretation of and compliance with the
Contract's language.
Another Contract provision requires use of a court, or an agreed upon
arbitration panel, to decide all disputes arising under the contract. Article
27 states that "[d]isputes or disagreements as to the interpretation or
performance of the provisions of this contract, except as otherwise provided
herein, shall be determined either by arbitration or court proceedings."347
The Secretary's asserted authority in making unilateral reasonable,
beneficial use decisions contravenes the clear language of the Contract. By
the Contract's terms, any dispute over reasonable, beneficial use must be
resolved by a court, unless the parties have mutually agreed to utilize
arbitration. Adoption of a regulation cannot amend the 1932 Contract.

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 266.

347.

Id. at art. 27, A612.
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The United States must honor the terms and provisions of its
contracts. As stated in United States v. Coachella Valley County Water District:348
A contract is a contract, regardless of whether it is made
between individuals or between individual and a
government agency; and if made with an agency, the latter
should not have the right to change any of terms of the duly
executed and partially performed contract.349
In addition, colorful, yet penetrating language cuts straight to the
current issue:
"Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are
ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the
grasp." Certainly when the contract in question was signed
by the irrigation district, the members were not grasping a
ghost which could elusively slip through their fingers or
change its character at the whim of a government official.350
The general language of the Reclamation Act and BCPA authorizes the
Secretary to "perform any and all acts and to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary and proper." However, nothing within the
authorizing language intimates that a subsequent regulation adopted years
later, Part 417, empowers the Secretary to undo the Contract between IID
and BuRec.
IV.

Overall Conclusion

Part 417 is only consistent with the intended congressional role for the
Secretary if it’s used to determine whether or not there is a valid dispute
regarding a Colorado River contractor's compliance with its contractual
obligation to order water reasonably required for beneficial use. Part 417 is
valid if limited solely to identify the Secretary's position on a contractor's

348. United States v. Coachella Valley County Water Dist., 111 F. Supp. 172, 180
(S.D.Cal. 1953).
349. See also Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S.
604, 607 (2000) ("'When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights
and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between
private individuals.'"); Hi-Shear Tech. Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 418, 421 (2003)
("[W]hen the United States enters contracts, its rights and duties are governed by the
laws applicable to private parties.").
350.

111 F. Supp. at 180.
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use of water. It is invalid to the extent that it attempts to substantively
resolve disputes over beneficial, reasonable use.
Application of Part 417 to adjudicate IID reasonable beneficial use in
2003 was an unprecedented federal attempt to exert control over established
state domain. If allowed to stand as a valid extension of federal authority,
the ripple of an enlarged and aggressive federal posture in the dominion of
reasonable, beneficial use will send a profound jolt to the core of western
states' rights. States such as California have painstakingly balanced
competing political interests through reasonable, beneficial use doctrine.
This delicate balance should not be subject to the inconsistent whim of
unfettered federal meddling under the Reclamation Act. This would upend a
century of federal deference to state reasonable, beneficial use
determinations. It would invariably upset the delicately woven balance
between urban, agricultural, and environmental interests reliant on the
Colorado River.

1578

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2008

APPENDIX: 43 C.F.R. Part 417
Title 43— Public Lands: Interior
Chapter I—Bureau of Reclamation Department of the Interior
Part 417—Procedural Methods for Implementing Colorado River Water
Conservation Measures with Lower Basin Contractors and Others

§ 417.1 Scope of part.
The procedures established in this part shall apply to every public or
private organization (herein termed ‘‘Contractor’’) in Arizona, California, or
Nevada which, pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project Act or to provisions
of other Reclamation Laws, has a valid contract for the delivery of Colorado
River water, and to Federal establishments other than Indian Reservations
enumerated in Article II(D) of the March 9, 1964, Decree of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of ‘‘Arizona v. California et al.’’, 376
U.S. 340 (for purposes of this part each such Federal establishment is
considered as a ‘‘Contractor’’), except that (a) neither this part nor the term
‘‘Contractor’’ as used herein shall apply to any person or entity which has a
contract for the delivery or use of Colorado River water made pursuant to
the Warren Act of February 21, 1911 (36 Stat. 925) or the Miscellaneous
Purposes Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 451), (b) Contractors and
permittees for small quantities of water, as determined by the Regional
Director, Bureau of Reclamation, Boulder City, Nev. (herein termed
‘‘Regional Director’’), and Contractors for municipal and industrial water
may be excluded from the application of these procedures at the discretion
of the Regional Director, and (c) procedural methods for implementing
Colorado River water conservation measures on Indian Reservations will be
in accordance with § 417.5 of this part
§ 417.2 Consultation with contractors.
The Regional Director or his representative will, prior to the beginning
of each calendar year, arrange for and conduct such consultations with each
Contractor as the Regional Director may deem appropriate as to the making
by the Regional Director of annual recommendations relating to water
conservation measures and operating practices in the diversion, delivery,
distribution and use of Colorado River water, and to the making by the
Regional Director of annual determinations of each Contractor’s estimated
water requirements for the ensuing calendar year to the end that deliveries
of Colorado River water to each Contractor will not exceed those reasonably
required for beneficial use under the respective Boulder Canyon Project Act
contract or other authorization for use of Colorado River water.
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§ 417.3 Notice of recommendations and determinations.
Following consultation with each Contractor and after consideration of
all relevant comments and suggestions advanced by the Contractors in such
consultations, the Regional Director will formulate his recommendations
and determinations relating to the matters specified in § 417.2. The
recommendations and determinations shall, with respect to each
Contractor, be based upon but not necessarily limited to such factors as the
area to be irrigated, climatic conditions, location, land classifications, the
kinds of crops raised, cropping practices, the type of irrigation system in
use, the condition of water carriage and distribution facilities, record of
water orders, and rejections of ordered water, general operating practices,
the operating efficiencies and methods of irrigation of the water users,
amount and rate of return flows to the river, municipal water requirements
and the pertinent provisions of the Contractor’s Boulder Canyon Project Act
water delivery contract. The Regional Director shall give each Contractor
written notice by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, of his
recommendations and determinations. If the recommendations and
determinations include a reduction in the amount of water to be delivered,
as compared to the calendar year immediately preceding, the notice shall be
delivered to the Contractor or timely sent by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, so that it may reasonably be delivered at least 30
days prior to the first date water delivery would be affected thereby, and
shall specify the basis for such reduction including any pertinent factual
determinations. The recommendations and determinations of the Regional
Director shall be final and conclusive unless, within 30 days of the date of
receipt of the notice, the Contractor submits his written comments and
objections to the Regional Director and requests further consultation. If,
after such further consultation, timely taken, the Regional Director does not
modify his recommendations and determinations and so advises the
Contractor in writing, or if modifications are made but the Contractor still
feels aggrieved thereby after notification in writing of such modified
recommendations and determinations, the Contractor may, before 30 days
after receipt of said notice, appeal to the Secretary of the Interior. During the
pendency of such appeal, and until disposition thereof by the Secretary, the
recommendations and determinations formulated by the Regional Director
shall be of no force or effect. In the event delivery of water is scheduled prior
to the new recommendations and determinations becoming final, said
delivery shall be made according to the Contractor’s currently proposed
schedule or to the schedules approved for the previous calendar year,
whichever is less.
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§ 417.4 Changed conditions, emergency, or hardship modifications.
A Contractor may at any time apply in writing to the Regional Director
for modification of recommendations or determinations deemed necessary
because of changed conditions, emergency, or hardship. Upon receipt of
such written application identifying the reason for such requested
modification, the Regional Director shall arrange for consultation with the
Contractor with the objective of making such modifications as he may deem
appropriate under the then existing conditions. The Regional Director may
initiate efforts for further consultation with any Contractor on his own
motion with the objective of modifying previous recommendations and
determinations, but in the event such modifications are made, the
Contractor shall have the same opportunity to object and appeal as
provided in § 417.3 of this part for the initial recommendations and
determinations. The Regional Director shall afford the fullest practicable
opportunity for consultation with a Contractor when acting under this
section. Each modification under this section shall be transmitted to the
Contractor by letter.
§ 417.5 Duties of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs with respect to
Indian reservations.
(a) The Commissioner of Indian Affairs (herein termed
‘‘Commissioner’’) will engage in consultations with various tribes and other
water users on the Indian Reservations listed in Article II (D) of said
Supreme Court Decree, similar to those engaged in by the Regional Director
with regard to Contractors as provided in § 417.2 of this part. After
consideration of all comments and suggestions advanced by said tribes and
other water users on said Indian Reservations concerning water
conservation measures and operating practices in the diversion, delivery,
distribution and use of Colorado River water, the Commissioner shall, within
the limits prescribed in said decree, make a determination as to the
estimated amount of water to be diverted for use on each Indian Reservation
covered by the above decree. Said determination shall be made prior to the
beginning of each calendar year. That determination shall be based upon,
but not necessarily limited to, such factors as: The area to be irrigated,
climatic conditions, location, land classifications, the kinds of crops raised,
cropping practices, the type of irrigation system in use, the condition of
water carriage and distribution facilities, record of water orders, and
rejections of ordered water, general operating practices, the operating
efficiencies and methods of irrigation of the tribes and water users on each
reservation, the amount and rate of return flows to the river, municipal water
requirements, and other uses on the reservation. The Commissioner of
Indian Affairs shall deliver to the Regional Director written notice of the
amount of water to be diverted for use upon each Indian Reservation for
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each year 60 days prior to the beginning of each calendar year and the basis
for said determination. The determination of the Commissioner shall be
final and conclusive unless within 30 days of the date of receipt of such
notice the Regional Director submits his written comments and objections
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and requests further consultation. If
after such further consultation, timely taken, the Commissioner does not
modify his determination and so advises the Regional Director in writing or
if modifications are made by the Commissioner but the Regional Director
still does not agree therewith, the Regional Director may, within 30 days
after receipt of the Commissioner’s response, appeal to the Secretary of the
Interior for a decision on the matter. During the pendency of such appeal
and until disposition thereof by the Secretary, water deliveries will be made
to the extent legally and physically available according to the
Commissioner’s determination or according to the Commissioner’s
determination for the preceding calendar year, whichever is less.
(b) Modifications of said determinations due to changed conditions,
emergency or hardship may be made by the Commissioner, subject,
however, to the right of the Regional Director to appeal to the Secretary, as
provided in the case of an initial determination by the Commissioner.
During the pendency of such an appeal, water deliveries will be made on the
basis of the initial determination.
§ 417.6 General regulations.
In addition to the recommendations and determinations formulated
according to the procedures set out above, the right is reserved to issue
regulations of general applicability to the topics dealt with herein.
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